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TWO MODELS OF UNPATENTABLE SUBJECT
MATTER
Alan L. Durham†
Patentable subject matter has become one of the most
controversial areas of patent law. Efforts to articulate a lucid and
productive theory of patentable subject matter must acknowledge that
there are two competing models of unpatentable subject matter. One
posits that natural laws, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are
themselves ineligible for patenting, and that each example of a natural
law, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea further defines a class of
inventions that cannot be patented because they lack an additional
element of ingenuity—or “inventive concept”—that sufficiently
distinguishes those inventions from their natural counterparts. This
“penumbral” model of unpatentable subject matter mirrors the
statutory structure of anticipation and obviousness. The competing
“binary” model of unpatentable subject matter posits that one must
only apply a natural law, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea in a
useful manner in order to have a patent-eligible invention. Potential
versus application is an either/or proposition. Recent attempts to
achieve synthesis have adopted the penumbral model. However, the
shadows and degrees of the penumbral model are an uncomfortable fit
for the subject-matter inquiry. Particularly in the case of natural laws,
treating newly discovered principles as a given (or as a baseline to
which one must add a further “inventive concept”) threatens to
overlook the true nature of invention, as well as valuable contributions
to the technological arts. Here, at least, the binary model is in need of
revival and reaffirmation.
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1988, University of California, Berkeley. I would like to thank Dean Kenneth Randall, Interim
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INTRODUCTION
The controversy that surrounds the doctrine of patentable subject
matter, which a series of Supreme Court decisions failed to resolve, is
the product of, in part, two competing and irreconcilable models of
unpatentable subject matter; the penumbral model and the binary
model.
Courts interpreting § 101 of the Patent Act have held that one
cannot patent an invention if it constitutes a natural law, a natural
phenomenon, or an abstract idea. Some decisions further suggest that
patent-ineligible subject matter casts a shadow larger than itself—in
other words, that for each natural law, natural phenomenon, or abstract
idea, one can identify a class of inventions that cannot be patented
because they are too similar to their ineligible counterparts.1 To escape
this shadow, an inventor must add something substantial to
differentiate the invention—an “inventive concept” in the form of
significant physical differences, unconventional steps, or meaningful
1. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012).
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limitations.2 Such distinctions, like those that determine obviousness of
a claimed invention in comparison to the prior art, are a matter of
degree.
Other decisions hold that any process, apparatus, or composition
of matter that usefully applies the latent potential of nature or an
abstract idea is an invention eligible for patenting.3 When one focuses
on potential and application, patentable subject matter is no longer a
matter of shadows and degrees; it is a binary either/or proposition. As
expressed in one opinion of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals,
“either the subject matter falls within Section 101 or it does not.”4
In their search for a consistent and intelligible approach to
unpatentable subject matter, courts have treated principles of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas as similar building blocks of
technological advancement. With that goal in mind, the penumbral
model of unpatentable subject matter has recently been advanced as the
model to apply in cases involving natural laws (e.g., the correlation
between certain metabolite levels and an effective dosage of
medicine),5 natural phenomena (e.g., the DNA found in human genes),6
and abstract ideas (e.g., the precaution of putting assets in the hands of
a trusted intermediary before completing a trade).7 Yet there are
problems in applying the same penumbral model of unpatentable
subject matter to each of the three off-limits categories—asking
whether, in each case, the claimed invention adds significantly more.
First, this approach fails to acknowledge, much less resolve, the
long-standing tension between the binary model of unpatentable
subject matter, based solely on the introduction of new utility through
human effort, and the penumbral model, which demands an additional
measure of ingenuity. Second, although they regularly deny it, courts
applying the penumbral model have introduced obviousness as a
consideration in the analysis of patentable subject matter. This
contradicts the fundamental structure of the Patent Act, in which
obviousness matters only in relation to human-made prior art. Finally,
when applied to natural laws, the penumbral model of unpatentable
subject matter treats nature, like human-made prior art, as a baseline or
starting point for invention. Invention often consists of a new
2. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
3. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
4. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
5. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
6. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. US Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1355
(Bryson, J., concurring).
7. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2357.
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understanding of what nature can do. If that new understanding is
dismissed, like prior art, as a given, we are missing the point, and useful
advances worthy of the patent incentive receive inadequate reward. In
this area at least, the binary potential/application model of unpatentable
subject matter is in need of revival and reaffirmation.
Part I of this article briefly summarizes the statutory conditions
for receiving a patent, including patentable subject matter, novelty,
nonobviousness, and adequate disclosure. Part II examines the
differences between natural laws, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas—the three categories of unpatentable subject matter identified by
the courts. Part III discusses principles of nature as unpatentable subject
matter, beginning with the cases of the Nineteenth Century and
continuing to the present day. The Supreme Court’s most recent
contribution, Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc.,8 demands that natural laws be “transformed” by the
addition of an “inventive concept” that exceeds the “well understood,
routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in
the field”9—a firm endorsement of a penumbral model of unpatentable
subject matter. Part IV discusses phenomena of nature as unpatentable
subject matter, culminating with the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,10
concerning the patentability of isolated human DNA. Part V discusses
abstract ideas as unpatentable subject matter, including the Supreme
Court’s 2010 decision in Bilski v. Kappos,11 concerning a system for
hedging risk in commodities markets, and its 2014 decision in Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank International,12 concerning the use of a trusted
intermediary in financial transactions. Part VI considers the attractions
of a unified approach to unpatentable subject matter and the
shortcomings of the penumbral model as a candidate for that role.
I.

CONDITIONS FOR RECEIVING A PATENT

The United States Constitution allows Congress to “promote the
Progress of . . . [the] useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”13 The
eighteenth-century term “useful arts” is equivalent to what we would
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
Id. at 1294.
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
561 U.S. 593 (2010).
134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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call “technology.”14 The efforts spurred by exclusive rights are
intended to “have a positive effect on society through the introduction
of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and
the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for
our citizens.”15
A. Section 101 and Its Exceptions
The requirements imposed on an inventor who seeks a patent are,
on their face, quite simple. First, § 101 of the Patent Act addresses,
categorically, the kinds of discoveries that are eligible for patenting. It
states:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.16

A patent-eligible invention must qualify as a process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter.17 “Process” is the only one of
these terms defined in the Patent Act, although in unhelpfully circular
terms. Section 100(b) states that “process” refers to a “process, art, or
method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine,
manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”18 The Supreme
Court, abiding by common usage, has defined “composition of matter”
as “all compositions of two or more substances and . . . all composite
articles,”19 and “manufacture” as “the production of articles for use
from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms,
qualities, properties, or combinations.”20 The use of such expansive
terms as “process” and “composition of matter,” in conjunction with
14. See Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 54 (1949) (“The term ‘useful arts,’ as used in the
Constitution . . . is best represented in modern language by the word ‘technology.’”).
15. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
16. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2013).
17. See In re Nuitjen, 500 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that a “signal” is not
patentable subject matter because it does not qualify as a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2013). In Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876), the Supreme
Court described a “process” as “a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given
result,” or “an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and
reduced to a different state or thing.” Id. at 788. Recently, the Supreme Court observed that while
a physical transformation is an “important clue” it is not indispensable to a patent-eligible process.
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 594 (2010).
19. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson,
149 F.Supp. 279, 280 (D.D.C 1957), aff’d, 252 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1958)).
20. Id. (quoting Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)).
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the all-embracing “any,” demonstrates Congress’s intention to define
patentable subject matter broadly21—extending, in the words of oftenquoted legislative history, to “anything under the sun that is made by
man.”22 This ensures that technological advancement will receive the
“liberal encouragement” envisioned by Thomas Jefferson, the original
architect of our patent system.23
Yet courts have long held that natural laws, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas are not patentable subject matter.24 For example,
Newton’s laws of gravity could not be patented even if they were
described as the process by which one mass attracts another.25
Similarly, one could not patent table salt (sodium chloride), although it
is unquestionably a “composition of matter” consisting of a molecular
union of sodium and chlorine atoms. Even if they were previously
unknown, these are not the kinds of discoveries that one can patent.
Natural laws and phenomena, together with abstract ideas, are said to
be building blocks of technological advancement that must remain
unencumbered by exclusive rights.26 They are “manifestations
of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”27
Hence, a thing made in the laboratory can be patented, but a similar
thing found in nature cannot,28 even though society finds the
discoveries equally beneficial, and the discoverer of each would be
encouraged to explore by an award of exclusive rights.
It is curious that a distinction so fundamental to patent law has no
explicit statutory basis. If anything, the language of the Patent Act

21. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 594–95 (“In choosing such expansive terms . . . Congress plainly
contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
at 308)).
22. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); see H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952); see also
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.
23. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–09 (quoting 5 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 75–76
(Washington ed. 1871)).
24. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)
(“The Court has long held that [§ 101] contains an important implicit exception. ‘[L]aws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not patentable.”) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 185 (1981)).
25. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (“Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that
E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.”).
26. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293 (“Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of
scientific and technological work. And monopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent
might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”) (citation omitted).
27. Id. (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
28. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 (“[Chakrabarty’s] discovery is not nature’s
handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101.”).
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undercuts it. Terms like “any . . . composition of matter”29
unquestionably embrace things found in nature. One might distinguish
between an invention made by human hands and the discovery of what
nature has made, but § 101 refers to “[a]nyone who invents or
discovers.”30 Section 101 does include the word “new,” which might
disqualify works of nature that have always existed. Courts have
generally refused to grasp at that textual straw, maintaining that
whether the invention is “new” is to be addressed only under §§ 102
(novelty) and 103 (obviousness).31 Nevertheless, in spite of the absence
of statutory support, courts have routinely held that natural laws,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are ineligible for patenting. The
reference in the Constitution to “Inventors” and their “Discoveries” (as
opposed, perhaps, to natural philosophers and their discoveries)32 may
exclude works of nature, and Congress at its most expansive did allude,
in the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act, to the potential for
patenting “anything under the sun that is made by man.”33 It seems
beyond debate, therefore, that Congress did intend for there to be some
unspoken limitations on the subject matter of patents.
B. The Other “Doors” to Patentability
An inventor who avoids claiming a natural law, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea is not automatically entitled to a patent.
Section 101 is only the “first door” on the way to patentability,34 and

29. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2013).
30. “Discovers” may have been included in § 101 for reasons having nothing to do with
patenting works of nature; it may have been included only to reinforce the principle expressed in
§ 103 that the patentability of an invention shall not depend on “the manner in which [it] was
made.” See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). A patentable invention may be revealed through patient
investigation or a happy accident, rather than the “flash of creative genius” that some cases prior
to the 1952 Patent Act had suggested was the standard for invention. See Cuno Eng’g Corp. v.
Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941). Under the 1952 Act, the standard for invention
is nonobviousness. If § 101 had said only “[w]hoever invents . . . ,” someone might have argued
that persons who discover technological advancements by accident do not act with the
intentionality required of “inventors.”
31. See, e.g., In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated in part sub nom.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), aff’d sub nom., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303 (1980) (“Notwithstanding the words ‘new and useful’ in § 101, the invention is not
examined under that statute for novelty because that is not the statutory scheme of things or the
long-established administrative practice.”).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
33. S. REP. NO.82-1979, at 4(1952); H. R. REP. NO.82-1923, at 6 (1952).
34. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 960 (introducing the analogy of multiple “doors” on the
path to patentability).
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§ 101 itself includes the requirement that the invention be “useful.”35
The utility requirement denies patents to inventions that do not work at
all (e.g., perpetual motion machines),36 or that have no concrete benefit
except as the basis for further research.37 If § 101 is satisfied, the next
barrier is § 102, which governs novelty.38 Among other things, § 102
denies a patent where “the claimed invention was patented, described
in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available
to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.”39
An invention is “available to the public” under § 102 when human
action, like the description of the invention in a scientific journal or its
embodiment in a product offered for sale, has made it so.40
If a patent claim encompasses a prior art reference in one of
§ 102’s enumerated categories, then the claim is “anticipated.”41 If the
prior art is close to the claimed invention, but not precisely the same,
the inquiry shifts to § 103, which denies a patent to an invention that is
obvious.42 Section 103 states:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained,
notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically
disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed
invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective
filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill
in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.43
35. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2013).
36. See Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
37. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (denying a patent to a process for creating
a steroid with no presently-known uses); see also In re ‘318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d
1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (the utility requirement prevents one from patenting a “research
proposal” or “mere ideas”).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2013).
39. Id. Section 102 allows certain exceptions—for example, in cases where the public
disclosure by another occurred less than one year before the application’s filing date, and after
public disclosure by the applicant. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2013). Section 102 changed
substantially following the America Invents Act, but those changes are not relevant to the present
discussion.
40. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2013).
41. See Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Claimed
subject matter is ‘anticipated’ when it is not new; that is, when it was previously known.”). “A
‘single prior art reference must expressly or inherently disclose each claim limitation to anticipate
a claim.’” Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 670 F.3d 1171, 1184 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (citation omitted).
42. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“[D]ifferences between the prior art reference and the claimed invention, however slight, invoke
the question of obviousness, not anticipation.”).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2013). Prior to the America Invents Act, the relevant time for
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The hypothetical “person having ordinary skill in the art” is a
person who might lack the special insights of the inventor, but is who
is competent in the ordinary manner and familiar with the prior art.44 In
addressing obviousness, it is appropriate to ask whether a person of
ordinary skill might have started with a particular prior art reference
and modified it in the manner claimed as an invention. For example, in
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,45 the Supreme Court determined that a
person of ordinary skill in the design of accelerator pedals could have
begun with an existing height-adjustable pedal and added an electronic
sensor, given the general trend in the automotive industry to move
toward electronic sensors.46
Even if the invention is new, useful, non-obvious, and patenteligible, a patent applicant must satisfy the disclosure requirements of
§ 112. Under § 112(b), the patent specification must conclude with
claims “particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the inventor . . . regards as the invention.”47 The
definiteness requirement ensures that the public knows “the bounds of
the protected invention” and that competitors of the patentee can avoid
infringement.48 Section 112 also requires that the specification include
“a written description of the invention . . . in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains . . . to make and use the same.”49 This language is the basis of
two separate requirements: the written description requirement, which
demands that the disclosures in the specification demonstrate the
inventor’s “possession” of the claimed invention,50 and the enablement
requirement, which demands that the specification include enough
information to allow a person of ordinary skill to make and use the
claimed invention without “undue experimentation.”51

considering obviousness was the time at which the invention was made. Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966).
44. See Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“A
person of ordinary skill in the art is . . . presumed to be one who thinks along the lines of
conventional wisdom in the art and is not one who undertakes to innovate . . . .”).
45. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
46. See id. at 419.
47. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2013).
48. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
49. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
50. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
51. See Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1288 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
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Both the written description requirement and the enablement
requirement have been used to invalidate claims that were broader than
could be justified by the disclosures of the specification. For example,
in In re Curtis52 the court held that a claim embracing dental floss made
of Teflon with any friction-enhancing coating failed the written
description requirement, when the applicant disclosed only one such
coating, and discovering materials that would stick to Teflon was a
notoriously difficult task.53 In Automotive Technologies Int’l, Inc. v.
BMW of North America, Inc.,54 the court invalidated a claim covering
electronic and mechanical side-impact crash sensors when the
specification enabled only the latter.55 The court warned that “claims
must be enabled to correspond to their scope.”56
Although § 101 is the only provision of the Patent Act that deals
with patentable subject matter, it is wise to consider all of the tools
available to the courts and the Patent Office when considering how
§ 101 should be applied. Courts have sometimes referred to § 101 as a
“coarse filter”—a first, and rarely fatal obstacle that is followed by
more demanding tests.57 Even if § 101 were no impediment to patenting
a natural law, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea, §§ 102 and 103
would prevent an applicant from claiming any natural law, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea that was already known, or obvious in
light of information available to the public. Nothing could be taken
from the public that, in that sense, it already possessed. Similarly, § 112
would require that an applicant who broadly claimed a principle
provide disclosures of appropriate breadth and detail—a potentially
impossible task if the invention was, in fact, nothing more than a
principle. Courts limiting the scope of patentable subject matter fear
that denying the fundamental tools of discovery to other researchers
will impede, rather than promote, the progress of the useful arts.58
Those concerns are valid. But § 101 is not the only tool, and not
necessarily the best tool, for addressing those issues.
52. 354 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
53. Id. at 1353.
54. 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
55. Id. at 1285.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (finding that section 112 “provides powerful tools to weed out claims that may present a
vague or indefinite disclosure of the invention,” even if the claim passes the “coarse eligibility
filter” of section 101).
58. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012) (noting that “upholding the patents would risk disproportionately tying up the use of the
underlying natural laws, inhibiting their use in the making of further discoveries”).
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II. DISTINGUISHING NATURAL LAWS, NATURAL PHENOMENA, AND
ABSTRACT IDEAS
It is a rare opinion that confines itself to discussing only one
category of unpatentable subject matter. The discussion typically
begins with a list of three types of unpatentable subject matter—natural
laws, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas—and by the end, if a
patent is denied, it is not always clear which forbidden category has
been invoked. The ubiquitous grouping of three might suggest that
natural laws, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are one and the
same (as a legal document might demand that one “stop, cease, and
desist”); but the care taken to always list them separately indicates that
they are genuinely different. The terminology varies. A court may refer
to natural laws or abstract ideas as “principles”59 or “abstract
intellectual concepts.”60 Natural phenomena may be called “physical
phenomena.”61 “Products of nature” is another common term,
embracing natural phenomena and possibly natural laws as well.62
Some courts add a fourth category of unpatentable subject matter—
“mental processes.”63 Others may subsume mental processes within the
category of abstract ideas. Mathematical formulas are also off-limits,64
though it is not always clear if that is because they are laws of nature,
abstract ideas, or both.
Although courts have not drawn clear distinctions between natural
laws, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, it will be helpful to
differentiate between them as much as possible. They raise similar
concerns, but if natural laws, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are
different, then different strategies may be best for dealing with them.
For purposes of discussion, we can define a natural law as a
generalized description of how nature functions—the way nature
behaves under particular circumstances, or a correspondence that one
can regularly observe. It is a law of nature that, absent special
circumstances, pure water turns to steam when it reaches a temperature
of 100º C at sea level. Laws of nature are often expressed as
mathematical formulas—like Newton’s inverse-square law, which
describes gravitational force according to the mass of the attracting
59. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a
fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in
either of them an exclusive right.”) (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853).
60. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
61. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
62. See id. at 313.
63. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; Flook, 437 U.S. at 589.
64. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
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bodies and their distance from one another. A phenomenon of nature
can be defined as a particular occurrence in nature, whether it is a
tangible thing or an event. The conversion of water into steam that
occurs in the reservoirs of Yellowstone’s Old Faithful geyser, and the
steam that is the result of that process, would be examples of natural
phenomena. The last category, abstract ideas, has proven very difficult
to define.65 A dictionary definition recently invoked by Judge Rader of
the Federal Circuit says that “abstract” means “disassociated from any
specific instance . . . expressing a quality apart from an object.”66 The
dictionary’s example is “poetry,” an abstract term that embraces any
and all poems.
Natural laws, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
completely distinct concepts, which explains why courts often discuss
them together, and ambiguously. Natural phenomena follow the
dictates of natural laws. The eruptions of steam from Old Faithful occur
because geothermal processes beneath the surface of the Earth have
heated the water beyond its boiling point. Natural laws are necessarily
abstract, because they are general descriptions of nature rather than
particular instances. But they may vary in their degree of abstractness.
It is a general law of nature that liquids have a boiling point at which
they vaporize into gas; the boiling point of water is a more specific
case. Natural phenomena can also be described in a manner that
combines particular instances, giving the description an abstract
character. “Steam,” for example, is an abstract term with which to
describe water in a gaseous state, whether it appears at Old Faithful or
anywhere else. This kind of abstraction combines concrete phenomena
of nature, linked by the common operation of natural laws, with the
human capacity to conceptualize, generalize, and name. Some abstract
ideas are not the work of nature at all, so long as one draws any
distinction between nature and mankind.67 Poetry is one example, life
insurance another. Whether mathematics is the work of nature or of
mankind is a question to engage the interest of philosophers.
So richly entangled are natural laws, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas that it might not seem worthwhile to treat them
65. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 621 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (complaining
that the majority “never provides a satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract
idea”).
66. CLS Bank, Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2356 (observing that the economic practice identified in Bilski as
an abstract idea “is a method of organizing human activity, not a ‘truth” about the natural world
‘that has always existed’” (citation omitted)).
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separately. However, they do pose different issues as far as patent law
is concerned. Natural laws are particularly difficult to separate from
process claims. A natural law can often be stated as an “if . . . then”
proposition—e.g., if water is heated to 100º C at sea level, then it will
turn to steam. Process claims describe a series of steps undertaken to
achieve a particular result—e.g., a method of producing steam,
comprising (a) accumulating a quantity of water, (b) holding the water
at atmospheric pressures equivalent to sea level, and (c) heating the
water to 100º C. Any process claim, at some level, can be described by
the operation of natural laws. Perhaps that is why some early cases
indicate that processes are more a matter of “discovery” than
“invention.”68 The distinction between a natural law and a patentable
invention can often be reduced to the difference between potential and
realization.
Where natural phenomena are concerned—things that actually
occur in nature—the issue is commonly how much the man-made
version must differ from its natural counterpart before it constitutes an
invention. Could one, for example, patent purified water if it were
purified to a degree never found in nature? All compositions of matter
(and all machines and manufactures) are made of materials derived
from nature, so the question is what one must do to those materials
before the result can be patented. Because the natural product and the
laboratory-altered version are equally concrete, the distinction between
potential and realization is less obvious here.
Abstractness is an issue that infects all types of patent claims. A
process claim that embraces only applications of a natural law could be
expressed in a highly abstract manner—e.g., a claim to any use of steam
to operate a power plant. The same issue could arise where a
composition of matter claim covers materials substantially altered from
their natural form—e.g., a claim to water purified in any manner
beyond what can be found in nature. Although a claim that embraces a
natural principle or natural phenomenon may be drawn abstractly,
distinguishing the invention from nature and addressing the abstract
qualities of the claim are potentially two very different things.
Moreover, abstractness problems can arise in the context of inventions
having very little to do with nature, such as those involving manners of

68. See, e.g., Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co. (The Telephone Cases), 126 U.S. 1, 533 (1888)
(discussing patents for those who “discover” processes and those who “invent” the means for
carrying them out); Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1854) (noting that a process “is usually
the result of discovery; a machine, of invention”).
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conducting a business. Precedent dealing with natural principles may
be difficult to apply in such cases.
As I discuss the history of unpatentable subject matter that has
culminated in the present state of the law, I will distinguish between
natural laws, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas as much as
possible, even where the courts themselves have not troubled to do so.
Afterwards, I will argue that the penumbral model of unpatentable
subject matter is less suited to dealing with nature than is the binary
alternative.
III. PATENTABLE INVENTIONS AND LAWS OF NATURE
A. The Early Cases
Although they long predate the current Patent Act, the patentable
subject matter cases of the Nineteenth Century are still cited regularly
today. Some of the earliest used the word “principle” to describe
subject matter not eligible for patenting. In Le Roy v. Tatham,69 the
Supreme Court considered a patent application based on the discovery
that a piece of lead could be firmly bonded to another under the
application of pressure and heat, a discovery that the applicant had
applied in the manufacture of lead pipes.70 The fact that lead surfaces
will adhere under those conditions can aptly be described as a principle
of nature. After noting a lack of precision in the use of the word
“principle,” the majority nevertheless observed that “a principle is not
patentable.”71 “A principle, in the abstract,” the court explained, “is a
fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented
as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”72 On the other
hand, where a principle is “applied to any special purpose, so as thereby
to effectuate a practical result and benefit not previously obtained,” a
patent for that application can be had, even if it is based on “the
discovery of a great, general, and most comprehensive principle in
science or law of nature.”73 Although the applicant in Le Roy had in
fact applied his discovery to the manufacture of superior lead pipes, he
made the mistake (fatal in the majority’s view) of claiming his

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

55 U.S. 156 (1853).
Id. at 157.
Id. at 175.
Id.
Id. (quoting Househill Co. v. Neilson, Webster’s Patent Cases 683 (1843)).
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invention as the machinery used in the process. The machinery itself
was not new.74
Dissenting Justice Nelson, who would have looked past the
infirmities of the claim, expanded upon the same concept of principle
versus application introduced by the majority. The patentee, he pointed
out, had turned “the discovery of this property of lead, which had never
before been known, but on the contrary, had been supposed and
believed, by all men of science skilled in metals, to be impossible” into
wrought lead pipe of such superiority that it had “wholly superseded
[its predecessors] in the market.”75 The apparatus used by the patentee
“was but incidental, and subsidiary to the new and leading idea of the
invention”—the “leading idea” being “[t]he discovery of a new
property in the article of lead.”76 That discovery “led naturally to the
apparatus,” which itself “required very little ingenuity.”77 Given “the
state of the art at the time,” the machinery could have been constructed
by “[a]ny skillful mechanic.”78 Its importance was only in making
practical use of the natural properties of lead.79 Drawing support from
English precedent involving Watt’s steam engine patent, Judge Nelson
observed that patenting a practical application did not amount to
patenting a natural principle.80 On the contrary, “[f]or every other
purpose and end, the principle [remains] free for all mankind to use.”81
Le Roy supports an either/or distinction between an unpatentable
law or principle of nature and a patentable application—a theme
revisited, in the context of an apparatus rather than a process, in
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America.82 Here the
invention concerned the design of a broadcast antenna, optimized
through the use of a mathematical formula.83 The court observed that
“[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a
patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid
of knowledge of scientific truth may be.”84 In this case, the scientific
74. See id. at 176.
75. Id. at 178 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 180.
77. Id.
78. Id. To expect novelty in the means, Judge Nelson wrote, would be “mistaking the skill
of the mechanic for the genius of the inventor.” Id. at 187.
79. Id. at 181.
80. Id. at 183.
81. Id. at 187.
82. 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
83. See id. at 91.
84. Id. at 94.
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truth was not the discovery of the patentee; the mathematical formula
had been published in a scientific journal thirty years before the
patentee designed his antenna.85 What the patentee claimed as his
invention was an application of that scientific truth in the form of a
superior apparatus.86 Because the formula had been disclosed before,
its application to antenna design could have been obvious (or, in the
language current before the 1952 Patent Act, not an “invention”).87 The
court assumed that it was not obvious (even though “it was achieved
by the logical application of a known scientific law to a familiar type
of antenna”) before finding that the patentee’s claims covered variants
inconsistent with the formula on which his disclosures relied—a
failure, apparently, to meet the written-description requirement.88
One of the most frequently cited patentable subject matter cases
of the nineteenth century is an English case—Neilson v. Harford.89 It
concerns the discovery that a furnace will operate more efficiently if
the air introduced into the combustion chamber is heated first (a system
known as the “hot blast”).90 The patentee claimed an arrangement for
heating the air in a separate vessel before it reached the combustion
chamber.91 He did not specify the size or shape of the vessel, or the
materials from which it should be made.92 The court held the invention
to be eligible for patenting.93 The case is consistent with the
principle/application dichotomy of Le Roy or Mackay. It is a principle
of nature that heated air facilitates efficient combustion; it is an
application of that principle to heat the air in a separate vessel in order
85. Id. at 93.
86. Id. at 93–94.
87. Cf. Deforest Radio Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 283 U.S. 664, 681–82 (1931). In Deforest,
scientific publications had disclosed the fact that ionization could be eliminated in vacuum tubes
by increasing the vacuum. Id. at 678–79. The patentee, armed with that knowledge, reduced the
pressure in known vacuum tubes and achieved a more regular current. Id. at 681–82. The court
observed that with knowledge of the principles at work it did not need the “genius of the inventor”
to act upon them by increasing the vacuum. Id. at 682. The patentee may have understood better
than others why the tubes produced superior results, but “[i]t is the method and device which may
be patented and not the scientific explanation of their operation.” Id. at 684–85. The opinion is
not as clear as it could be, but it does suggest, by its reference to the “genius of the inventor,” that
an invention could be challenged on grounds obviousness (as opposed to patent-eligible subject
matter) where it consists of an application of known scientific principles.
88. “The claimed use of the empirical formula for the calculation of the angle for wires
which are not multiples of half wave lengths long thus involved a departure from what [the
patentee’s] application had described as his invention, and a contradiction of it.” Id. at 99.
89. (1841) 51 Eng. Rep. 1266 (Exch. Of Pleas).
90. Id. at 1273.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1274.
93. Id.
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to improve the combustion in a furnace. “The plaintiff,” the court
found, “does not merely claim a principle, but a machine embodying a
principle, and a very valuable one.”94 The discussion in Neilson,
however, introduces one element that clouds the picture. The court
said: “We think the case must be considered as if, the principle being
well known, the plaintiff had first invented a mode of applying it by a
mechanical apparatus to furnaces.”95
Why the court thought it necessary to consider the case as if the
newly discovered natural principle were “well known” cannot be
determined from the context. The court may only have meant that an
application of a natural principle can qualify as an invention even if the
principle is well known—as Mackay’s antenna could have qualified as
a patentable-eligible application of a known mathematical formula.
Therefore a patentee who actually discovers a natural principle should
be in no worse position. On the other hand, the court could have meant
that one should actually pretend that a newly discovered natural
principle is well known, and somehow factor this in when deciding
whether an invention constitutes the principle itself or a patentable
application of the principle. If this is what the court meant, it contrasts
sharply with Judge Nelson’s understanding of the principle/application
dichotomy, wherein an application may be a patentable invention even
though the “leading idea” behind it is the discovery of the principle
itself.
B. Funk Bros.
The doubts planted in Neilson were compounded in Funk Bros.
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.96 The case concerned strains of rootnodule bacteria, called inoculants, used to fix nitrogen in leguminous
plants.97 Farmers generally applied to each crop a single strain of
bacteria adapted to that species of plant.98 Strains were not mixed in
multi-use combinations because different strains of bacteria were
thought to have a mutually inhibiting effect.99 The patentee discovered
that certain strains could be mixed together without reducing their
effectiveness, leading to a single product that could be applied, for

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 1273.
Id.
333 U.S. 127 (1948).
Id. at 128–29.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 129–30.
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example, to clover, alfalfa, and soybeans.100 The Supreme Court held
that the inoculant mixture was not a patentable invention.
Citing Le Roy, the court held that “patents cannot issue for the
discovery of the phenomena of nature.”101 They are “part of the
storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.”102 The court reaffirmed the principle/application
dichotomy that we have seen before:
He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no
claim to a monopoly of it that the law recognizes. If there is to be
invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application
of the law of nature to a new and useful end.103

The non-inhibiting qualities of certain strains of bacteria the court
called the “handiwork of nature.”104 Taking advantage of those
qualities by devising a multi-use combination of selected inoculant
strains would appear to be an application of a natural principle to a new
and useful end.105 In fact, the court admits that it is.106 But the court
proceeds to dismiss the invention as a negligible advancement in
packaging, “however ingenious the discovery of [the] natural principle
may have been.”107
[O]nce nature’s secret of the non-inhibitive quality of certain strains
of the species of Rhizobium was discovered, the state of the art made
the production of a mixed inoculant a simple step. Even though it
may have been the product of skill, it certainly was not the product
of invention. There is no way in which we could call it such unless
we borrowed invention from the discovery of the natural principle
100. See id.
101. Id. at 130. Funk Bros. is a case that blurs the distinction between principles and
phenomena of nature. The bacteria were not genetically engineered, so they might be
characterized as phenomena of nature. Id. The fact that certain strains of bacteria are mutually
non-inhibiting is a fact about nature, best characterized as a natural law or principle. Id. Whether
non-inhibition is also a phenomenon of nature would depend, according to our working definition,
on whether these strains of bacteria were found combined in nature, so that their non-inhibiting
qualities were more than theoretical. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 131.
105. See id. (“There is, of course, an advantage in the combination. The farmer need not buy
six different packages for six different crops. He can buy one package and use it for any or all of
his crops of leguminous plants.”).
106. “The aggregation of select strains of the several species into one product is an
application of that newly-discovered natural principle.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he application of this
newly-discovered natural principle to the problem of packaging of inoculants may well have been
an important commercial advance.” Id. at 132.
107. Id. at 132.
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itself. That is to say, there is no invention here unless the discovery
that certain strains of the several species of these bacteria are noninhibitive and may thus be safely mixed is invention. But we cannot
so hold without allowing a patent to issue on one of the ancient
secrets of nature now disclosed.108

Here the court shifts from the principle/application distinction of
patent eligibility to the question of “invention”—the quantum of
ingenuity required of a patentable advancement in relation to the state
of the art. After “nature’s secret” has been revealed, the combination
of non-inhibiting strains of bacteria is an easy step; hence, to call the
combination an “invention” one would have to “borrow[] invention
from the discovery of the natural principle itself.” Judge Nelson
expressed the view in Le Roy that “the most important part of the
invention, may consist in . . . the discovery of the principle of
science . . . and little or no pains may have been taken in working out
the best mode of the application of the principle.”109 As a “principle
turned to account,” wrote Judge Nelson, the application is,
nevertheless, a patent-eligible advancement.110 Funk Bros. suggests, on
the contrary, that one must discount the natural principle when deciding
if the application of it is “inventive” enough to receive a patent, even if
the principle is in fact newly discovered. Otherwise, patents could issue
on the “ancient secrets of nature.” The binary principle/application
distinction is not decisive; to claim more than the natural principle
itself, one must not only apply the principle to a new and useful end,
one must apply it in an ingenious manner.
Today we would ask whether the court was talking about
patentable subject matter under § 101 or obviousness under § 103.
Under the current law, one could reach the same result without
disturbing the principle/application dichotomy of patentable subject
matter by treating even unknown natural principles as a form of prior
art, in comparison to which the invention must be nonobvious. But
Funk Bros. was decided in 1948, before the 1952 Patent Act made
nonobviousness, as expressed in § 103, the applicable standard of
inventiveness. Before the 1952 Patent Act, courts would ask whether
the claimed advancement qualified as an “invention” in comparison to
the prior art—a leap that might require the “genius” of an inventor,
rather than the skill of a mechanic.111 This makes Funk Bros.’s
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 185 (1853) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
Id.
See Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
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more

C. “Invention” and Obviousness
A handful of Appellate Court cases after Funk Bros., but before
the 1952 Patent Act, deal with the subject of “invention” in a similar
manner. Davison Chemical Corp. v. Joliet Chemicals, Inc. involved the
manufacture of silica gel, a substance with microscopic pores that is
useful as a desiccant.112 The material was manufactured by treating
sodium silicate with an acid, after which the acid was washed away
with water.113 The patentee discovered that the size of the pores in the
silica gel was a product of the temperature of the water, and that a
higher temperature produced a product of lower density.114 Based on
this “scientific fact [that] no other delver in the art had discovered,” the
patentee claimed a process for controlling the density of silica gel by
adjusting the temperature of the water.115 Acknowledging the longstanding principle/application dichotomy, the court observed that “[i]t
is one thing to discover a scientific fact, a law existing in nature, and
quite another to invent a means of making that discovery useful.”116 Yet
the question here was whether the patentee’s application of the newly
discovered principle amounted to an “invention.”117 This depended on
whether a “skilled scientist, having been informed of the newly
discovered scientific fact,” would have found adjusting the temperature
of the water to be more than “the exercise of ordinary skill in his
profession.”118 In other words, the principle discovered by the patentee
must be treated as though it were prior art.119 Here, had the principle
been known, the adjustment of the water temperature would have been
a matter of ordinary skill and routine experimentation.120
Even after the passage of the 1952 Patent Act had replaced lack of
“invention” with obviousness, the kind of analysis seen in Davison
112. 179 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1950).
113. Id. at 794.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.; see also In re Arnold, 185 F.2d 686, 691 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (holding that it is not an
“invention” to select the frequency to be used in an alternating electrostatic field, when the
selection is routine following the discovery of a previously unknown scientific relationship).
118. Davison, 179 F.2d at 794.
119. See id. at 795 (“Discovery of a previously unknown law of operation, involved in no
new method, has never been held to be invention. The application of the law must be novel and
inventive in character.”).
120. Id.
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continued at the appellate court level. In 1963, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals decided National Lead Co. v. Western Lead Products Co.,
a case concerning the manufacture of lead oxide.121 Much like the
patentee in Davison, the patentee in National Lead discovered a
relationship between the temperature used in existing processes for
producing lead oxide and the qualities of the resulting material.122 By
controlling the temperature, the patentee could control the size, nature,
and uniformity of particles within the manufactured product.123 He did
this by adjusting the flow of molten lead into the “pot.”124 The court
assumed that the patentee had discovered the natural relationship
between temperature and particle formation, but framed the issue as
“whether an artisan, knowing that the temperature of the reaction
determines the uniformity of the product, would require more than
ordinary skill to discover the [patentee’s] process of controlling the
reaction temperature.”125 The answer to that question was no.126
The Third Circuit reached similar results in Armour
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,127 where the patentee
discovered that the optimal point for the absorption of the enzyme
trypsin, an anti-inflammatory agent, was the ileum—the lower third of
the human small intestine.128 To deliver orally administered trypsin to
the ileum, past the acidic environment of the stomach, the patentee
applied an enteric coating to the trypsin pill by a well-known process.129
Because one cannot patent a law of nature, the court found that one
could not claim “the discovery that the ileum will absorb orally
administered trypsin.”130 Here the inventor did not claim the principle
itself or every use of the principle; he claimed only the use of trypsin
as an anti-inflammatory agent and its administration through a coated
pill.131 Although the pill constituted a useful application of the
discovery, and the court found no policy reason for demanding that the
method of applying the discovery be nonobvious, the court reasoned

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

324 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 541.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 542 (emphasis added).
Id. at 545–46.
396 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1968).
See id. at 72.
See id.
Id. at 72–73.
Id. at 71 n.3.
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that, under Funk Bros., the pill must be found unpatentable.132 The test,
as the court read Funk Bros., was this: “[w]ould an artisan, knowing
the newly discovered natural phenomenon[,] require more than
ordinary skill to discover the process by which to apply that
phenomenon as the patentee had done?”133 In this case, “[o]nce nature’s
secret that the ileum would absorb trypsin was uncovered,” any person
skilled in the art could have taken advantage of that secret by applying
a suitable coating to the pill.134
Davison, National Lead, and Armour approach the issue from the
novelty side—asking not whether the patentee’s application of a natural
principle is patentable subject matter, but whether it marks the kind of
inventive leap worthy of a patent. They turn natural principles into a
kind of prior art by assuming, contrary to fact, that they were already
known, and imagining whether a person of ordinary skill, so informed,
would have been able to apply the principle in the manner claimed. If
the principles had been known—because, for example, they had been
published in scientific journals—then the analysis would be
appropriate. The reports in the journals would be a component of the
art, and one should ask whether claimed methods of applying those
reports were nonobvious. But there is a danger in treating even
unknown principles as a given, or a starting place for invention. As
Justice Frankfurter remarked in his Funk Bros. concurrence,
“[e]verything that happens may be deemed ‘the work of nature.’”135 If
one hypothesizes a person skilled in the art knowing everything there
is to know about the principles underlying an invention, then the
application of those principles inevitably becomes a matter of routine.
Cases like National Lead and Armour are difficult to square with
a concurrent line of authority addressing whether one may assume an
exhaustive understanding of the problem when asking whether the
solution to the problem warrants a patent. In In re Connover, the
applicant discovered that roller bearings failed from excess heat caused
by the galling of certain parts in the assembly.136 The solution, which
he sought to patent, was to plate those surfaces with a non-galling
metal.137 Because the source of the problem was unknown, the plating
had not been previously done; however, if the source of the problem
132. See id. at 74.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 135 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
136. 304 F.3d 680, 681 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
137. Id. at 683–84.
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had been known, the plating would have been an obvious solution.
Applying § 103, the court held that it was “unobvious to discover the
cause of the bearing failures,” and that “the unobvious cause of the
problem solved, as well as the solution proposed,” must be
considered.138 In the context of obviousness, the invention must be
evaluated “as a whole,” and in this case the applicant’s “composite
contribution” consisted of both the discovery of the nature of the
underlying problem and the means to solve it.139 The same reasoning
would suggest that the obviousness of an invention applying a newly
discovered principle should also be evaluated “as a whole”—with
consideration of the “composite contribution” that consists of the
discovery of a natural principle as well as the means to apply it in a
new and useful manner.
D. The Software Trilogy
The Supreme Court returned to patentable subject matter—as a
question distinct from nonobviousness—in its trilogy of software
patent cases: Gottschalk v. Benson,140 Parker v. Flook,141 and Diamond
v. Diehr.142 Benson concerned a software algorithm for converting one
form of a binary number to another.143 The court reaffirmed the
principle/application distinction, holding that “phenomena of nature”
are unpatentable as “basic tools of scientific and technological work,”
and citing Funk Bros. for the proposition that “[i]f there is to be
invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of
the law of nature to a new and useful end.”144 The court found Benson’s
algorithm claims so “abstract and sweeping” that they would preempt
138. Id. at 684.
139. Id.; see also In re Roberts, 470 F.2d 1399, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“a patentable
invention may lie in the discovery of the source of a problem even though the remedy may be
obvious once the source of the problem is identified;” understanding the problem is a part of the
“subject matter as a whole” that must be evaluated under § 103). In a similar case, In re Prater,
415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969), the applicant invented an improved method of spectral analysis
based on the use of a newly-discovered principle of mathematics to program a digital computer.
Id. at 1405–06. The programmed computer, as an apparatus, should not have been deemed obvious
when the principle dictating its programming was new to the art. The discovery was “part of [the
applicant’s] contribution;” the examiner’s analysis, which treated the mathematical principle as
though it were prior art, was “fatally defective.” Id. at 1405. The programmed computer could not
be obvious under § 103 “because one not having knowledge of [the applicant’s] discovery simply
would not know what to program the computer to do.” Id. at 1406.
140. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
141. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
142. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
143. Benson, 409 U.S. at 65.
144. Id. at 67 (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130).
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all uses of the mathematical principle and amount to a patent on the
concept itself.145 Benson turned on the applicant’s lack of specificity in
applying the mathematics, rather than on whether the means for
applying it was itself inventive.146
Not until Flook did the court revisit the relationship between
patentable subject matter and novelty. Flook dealt again with a
mathematical formula, which the court deemed to be “like a law of
nature,” and similarly unpatentable.147 The question to be addressed
was “whether the identification of a limited category of useful, though
conventional, post-solution applications of such a formula makes [the
claimed] method eligible for patent protection.”148 The invention
concerned the adjustment of “alarm limits” in a process for the catalytic
conversion of hydrocarbons.149 Alarm limits are threshold values for
measured variables like temperature, pressure, and flow rates.150 If a
measurement exceeds the alarm limit it indicates a problem.151 The
applicant claimed a method of “updating” alarm limits during transient
process stages, like start-up, through a process of constant
measurement and calculation.152 The applicant’s mathematical
algorithm, executed by a programmed computer, the court assumed to
be “novel and useful.”153 However, the algorithm was the only
difference between the applicant’s method and conventional methods
already in use.154
Flook cites Le Roy for the proposition that a “principle, in the
abstract” is a “fundamental truth” in which no one can claim an
exclusive right.155 Quoting Funk Bros., the court observes that, “[i]f
there is to be invention from [the discovery of a law of nature], it must
come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful

145. Id. at 68.
146. Id. at 68, 72. The court observed that the claim was so “abstract and sweeping” that the
use of the mathematical principle could “vary from the operation of a train to verification of
drivers’ licenses to researching the law books for precedents,” and that the technique could be “be
performed through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery or without any
apparatus.” Id. at 68.
147. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589.
148. Id. at 585.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. Id. at 588.
154. Id. at 585–86.
155. Id. at 589 (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853)).
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end.”156 But the court rejected the applicant’s argument that a process
“implementing a principle in some specific fashion . . . automatically
falls within the patentable subject matter of § 101,” leaving novelty and
nonobviousness to §§ 102 and 103.157 The court rejected, in other
words, a binary principle/application dichotomy for § 101. Instead, it
demanded that “the process . . . itself be new and useful,”158 meaning
that some aspect of the process other than the principle must be
inventive. This is determined by treating the mathematical formula “as
if [it] were well known,”159 and “a familiar part of the prior art,”160 and
by asking if there is “some other inventive concept”161 to be found in
the claimed invention. The applicant’s claim fell short. Except for the
mathematical algorithm discovered by the applicant, everything about
the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons was well known. If the
algorithm were also treated as “a familiar part of the prior art,” then
nothing remained to constitute a patentable invention.162
The court justified this approach as an answer to the “draftsman’s
163
art.” Any “competent draftsman,” the court warned, “could attach
some form of post-solution activity to almost any mathematical
formula.”164 It would “exalt[] form over substance” to say that “postsolution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process.”165 To
meaningfully distinguish between a principle and an invention, the
applicant should not only apply the principle, but apply it in an
inventive manner. Hence, like a prior art reference under § 102, a
principle casts a penumbra of unpatentability, its borders defined by
whatever applications are conventional or obvious once the principle
has become known.
The reasoning in Flook is easily criticized. Judge Rich of the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals, who played a prominent role in
crafting the 1952 Patent Act, had little good to say about it in In re

156. Id. at 591 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
(1948)).
157. Id. at 593.
158. Id. at 591 (“The process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm, must be new
and useful. Indeed, the novelty of the mathematical algorithm is not a determining factor at all.”).
159. Id. at 592.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 594.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 593.
164. Id. at 590.
165. Id.
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Bergy166 the following year. He found in Flook “an unfortunate and
apparently unconscious, though clear, commingling of distinct
statutory provisions which are conceptually unrelated”167—namely,
patentable subject matter under § 101 and nonobviousness under
§ 103.168 The commingling undermined both provisions. To treat a law
of nature as “a familiar part of the prior art,” when, in fact, “it was not
familiar, was not prior, was discovered by the applicant for patent, was
novel at the time he discovered it, and was useful,” was to give the
technical term “prior art,” in Judge Rich’s words, “an entirely new
dimension with consequences of unforeseeable magnitude.”169
Moreover, to inquire at the “first door”—the door of patentable subject
matter—whether aspects of the invention are new and unconventional
is to misunderstand the statutory scheme: “[a]n invention can be
statutory subject matter and be 100% old, devoid of any utility, or
entirely obvious.”170
In fact, the problem with Flook runs deeper than the blurring of
statutory categories. Presumably, the applicant’s use of a newlydiscovered mathematical formula to update alarm limits changed
something about the operation of the catalytic conversion process.
Perhaps disasters were averted that would otherwise have occurred, or
processes were allowed to continue that would otherwise have been
needlessly aborted. If so, it would be counterfactual to call the
application of the formula “conventional,” or even “obvious.” One can
say that the application would have been obvious if someone else had
already discovered the formula and made it public, but to ignore what
actually occurred gives little credit and no reward to someone whose
efforts advanced the progress of the useful arts. Perhaps that is why
Judge Rich warned, in In re Bergy, of “[t]he potential for great harm to
the incentives of the patent system.”171
The Supreme Court backtracked considerably in Diehr, the final
case of the trilogy. The invention in Diehr concerned the operation of
a rubber molding press.172 The applicant used a mathematical
formula173 and constant temperature measurements to calculate, using
166. 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 965.
170. Id. at 963.
171. Id. at 966.
172. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177–78 (1981).
173. The mathematical formula was the Arrhenius equation, a formula that was already
known in the art. Id. at 177 n.2.
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a computer, the proper time to open the press.174 The method addressed
the problem of over- or undercuring.175 As claimed, the applicant’s
process began with the loading of uncured rubber and ended with the
automatic opening of the press.176 The court observed that
manufacturing processes of this kind had long been eligible for
patenting, and its status was not changed merely because certain steps
of the process took advantage of a mathematical formula and a
programmed computer.177 Reverting to a binary model of unpatentable
subject matter, the court described as “commonplace” the idea that “an
application of a law of nature or a mathematical formula” may be
patented.178 Even if the formula was “not patentable in isolation,” a
process for curing rubber that employed the formula would not be
“barred at the threshold by § 101.”179
The court did not follow in the footsteps of Flook by treating the
Arrhenius equation as prior art (which in this case it actually was), and
inquiring whether the rest of the claimed process included elements that
were nonobvious or unconventional. The applicant’s claim, wrote the
court, must be evaluated “as a whole:”
It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements
and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the
analysis. . . . The “novelty” of any element or steps in a process, or
even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether
the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of
possibly patentable subject matter.180

The court flatly denied that it had used a contrary analysis in
Flook—an analysis that would ignore a newly-discovered natural
principle as a component of the invention.181 “[I]f carried to its
extreme,” that approach would “make all inventions unpatentable
because all inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of
nature, which, once known, make their implementation obvious.”182
The court also distinguished Flook on the facts. The process in Flook
was completed with the updating of the alarm limit.183 The court
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 178–79.
See id.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 187 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 188.
Id. at 188–89.
Id. at 189 n.12.
Id.
Id. at 192 n.14.
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referred to this as “token post-solution activity.”184 The application in
Flook did not provide any details about the catalytic conversion
process, including the selection of variables for the alarm limits or the
means for setting off an alarm.185 Like the claimed invention in Benson,
the claimed invention in Flook began and ended with a number.186 In
contrast, the claim in Diehr described a complete process of molding
rubber, beginning with the loading of the press and ending with a
perfectly-cured rubber product—“a result heretofore unknown in the
art.”187 Although the court did not say it, by this reasoning the invention
in Flook would have qualified as patentable subject matter if it had been
claimed as a complete process for the catalytic conversion of
hydrocarbons, one part of which was the adjustment of alarm limits by
a newly-devised mathematical formula. The process, in that case,
would have ended not with a number but with correctly-processed
hydrocarbons.
E. The Recent Cases
Diehr seemed to reinstate the binary principle/application model
of patentable subject matter. Laws of nature, as such, are not patenteligible. However, put a law of nature in the context of a concrete
application and the result is patent-eligible, even in cases where, if the
law of nature had been already discovered, the remaining elements of
the invention would have been obvious. Nevertheless, the penumbral
model of unpatentable subject matter was not finished, and in recent
years it has achieved a prominence not seen since the days of Funk
Bros. and Flook.
It began with Laboratory Corp. of America v. Metabolite
Laboratories.188 The patent disclosed a process for diagnosing vitamin
deficiencies by measuring the level of the amino acid homocysteine in
a patient’s blood.189 The correlation between vitamins and
homocysteine is a principle of nature, and the claim required nothing
more than measuring the homocysteine level, using existing tests, and
reflecting on what it meant.190 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 193 n.15.
188. 548 U.S. 124 (2006).
189. Id. at 125.
190. Id. at 129. The claim read: “A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate
in warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of: assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of
total homocysteine; and correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said body fluid with
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consider whether the patent claimed eligible subject matter.191 When
the court reconsidered and dismissed certiorari, Justice Breyer, who
would have found the invention unpatentable subject matter,
dissented.192 Laws of nature, he wrote, are unpatentable because they
are “basic tools” of research, and part of the “storehouse of knowledge”
that should be reserved to common use.193 Although rewarding the
discovery of such “basic tools” could create positive incentives, it
would “too often severely interfere with, or discourage, development
and spread of useful knowledge itself.”194 It would be a case of “too
much patent protection” actually impeding the progress of the useful
arts.195
One could argue that diagnosing a vitamin deficiency (presumably
as a prelude to treatment) is a useful application of the natural
relationship between vitamins and homocysteine. However, Justice
Breyer was less interested in utility than in preemption. He conceded
that “laws of nature” may be useful, and that research into those laws
“may prove of great benefit to the human race.”196 Yet he questioned
whether even natural laws applied in a practical manner necessarily
qualify as patentable subject matter.197 The Federal Circuit, he
observed, had referred to a “useful, concrete, and tangible result” as the
key to identifying an abstract principle that had been applied in a
patentable way.198 Indeed, it is difficult to see how a process that
produces a “useful, concrete and tangible result” could be anything
other than a practical application of a natural law. Justice Breyer could
have found that the process claimed in Lab Corp., which ended with
the contemplation of the test results, did not produce a “useful” result.
Instead, he rejected the Federal Circuit’s formulation as inconsistent
with Supreme Court precedent.199 Even if the diagnostic process
a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.” Id.
191. Id. at 125.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 127.
194. Id. at 128.
195. Id. at 126.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 126–27.
198. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); State St. Bank &
Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d. 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
199. Justice Breyer’s examples are interesting. One is O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854),
which turned on the applicant’s failure to limit his claim to any specific manner of using
electromagnetism to transmit printed messages—more an issue of breadth than of a natural law
per se. See infra Part V. Justice Breyer’s other examples are Benson and Flook, each a case
concerning the calculation of numbers, and in which any useful, concrete or tangible result was,
at best, implied. Justice Breyer said of Benson that the transformation of numbers from one binary
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applied the natural correspondence in a useful, concrete, and tangible
way, Justice Breyer would not have found it patentable.
The Supreme Court next considered patentable subject matter in
Bilski v. Kappos.200 Because the case concerned methods of hedging
risks in commodities markets,201 it is far removed from natural laws and
their practical application. Yet the court confirmed some basic
principles. “Laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas”
are unpatentable subject matter—part of the “storehouse of
knowledge” that is exempt from patenting.202 The court described the
exceptions as “consistent with the notion that a patentable process must
be ‘new and useful.’”203 On the other hand, “an application of a law of
nature or mathematical formula” may qualify as patentable subject
matter.204 Although the court cited Diehr for the proposition that a
claim must be evaluated as a whole and without ignoring the presence
of “old elements,”205 the court also cited Flook for its dismissal of
“token post solution components.”206 Reverting to the mingling of
statutory subject matter and novelty that was characteristic of Flook,
the court relied on the applicant’s addition, in Bilski, of “well known
random analysis techniques” to the abstract idea of hedging risk.207
Justice Breyer, concurring, questioned once again the Federal Circuit’s
standard of a “useful, concrete, and tangible result” to identify
patentable subject matter, complaining of its association with patents
that border on absurdity.208 Justice Stevens, who also concurred,
cautioned against conflating novelty with the separate issue of
patentable subject matter.209
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, a Federal Circuit
case of the following year, refocused attention on natural laws and the
practice of medicine.210 The patentee discovered that the schedule used
format to another was “useful, concrete, and at least arguably (within the computer’s wiring
system) tangible.” Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 137. But, like the claim in Lab. Corp. which ended
with the mere contemplation of test results, the claims in Benson did not direct that anything
specifically useful be done with numbers following their calculation. Benson, 409 U.S. at 73–74.
200. 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
201. Id. at 599.
202. Id. at 601–02.
203. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101).
204. Id. at 611.
205. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
206. Id. at 612.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 659 (Breyer, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 620–21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
210. 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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for immunizing infants against infectious diseases could affect the later
occurrence of chronic disorders like asthma and diabetes.211 The
patents-in-suit included broad claims. Some would be infringed when
a health care professional (a) reviewed the literature indicating a
correspondence between an immunization schedule and a chronic
disorder, and (b) immunized according to the schedule promising a
reduced risk.212 Other claims would be infringed merely by assessing
the risk, even if the information did not lead to a different treatment.213
The patentee characterized the invention as “a new and useful
application of a newly discovered scientific fact.”214 As to the first type
of claim, the court agreed. When they included “the physical step of
immunizing on the determined schedule,” the claims were “directed to
a specific, tangible application.”215 But the other claims did not pass
even the “coarse filter”216 of patent eligibility:
[These] claims do not include putting [the knowledge gleaned from
reviewing the literature] to practical use, but are directed to the
abstract principle that variation in immunization schedules may
have consequences for certain diseases. In contrast, the [other]
claims . . . require the further act of immunization in accordance
with a lower-risk schedule, thus moving from abstract scientific
principle to specific application.217

The court did not discuss whether immunizing according to the
indicated schedule would have been an obvious or conventional step
once the natural correspondence was revealed. It is difficult to imagine
that it would not have been obvious. Hence, in spite of developments
at the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit in Classen still seemed firmly
in the camp of a binary analysis of unpatentable subject matter. When
the claim calls for nothing more than contemplation of a natural law, it
is unpatentable subject matter; when it applies a natural law to a
practical use, it is patentable-eligible.
Yet, shortly afterward, the Supreme Court dealt a serious blow to
the binary model of unpatentable subject matter. In Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,218 the patent
covered a process for determining whether the dosage of thiopurine
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 1060.
Id. at 1061.
See id.
Id. at 1063.
Id. at 1066.
See id.
Id. at 1067–68.
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
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drugs, used to treat autoimmune diseases, was too high or too low, by
measuring the level of certain metabolites in the patient’s blood.219 The
Supreme Court called the relationship between the metabolite level and
the optimal dosage a “natural law.”220 Like the rejected claims in
Classen, the patent in Mayo could be infringed by testing for the
metabolite levels, even if no change in treatment followed.221 The
claims included only an “administering” step, referring to the use of
thiopurine drugs; a “determining” step, referring to the tests that
measure metabolite concentrations; and a “wherein” step (not really a
“step” at all, because it required no action), referring to the significance
of the measured concentrations.222
The court recited the usual list of unpatentable subject matter—
“[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”223 They are
the “basic tools” of innovation, and exclusive rights to them would
impede the progress of technology.224 However, too broad an exclusion
would “eviscerate patent law” because “all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.”225 An application of a natural law might
qualify as patentable subject matter.226 So far, the binary
principle/application dichotomy appears to be alive and well. But, as in
Flook, the court expressed the concern that patent eligibility should not
depend on the “draftsman’s art.”227 In order to “transform a law of
nature into a patent-eligible application” one must “do more than
simply state the law of nature while adding the words ‘apply it.’”228
The court held that in order to “transform” a natural law into a
patentable application, a process claim must include “other elements or
219. Before the discovery of how metabolites could be used to determine the proper dosage,
“it [had] been difficult for doctors to determine whether for a particular patient a given dose [was]
too high, risking harmful side effects, or too low, and so likely ineffective.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at
1295.
220. Id. at 1297. The general correlation was already known; the patentee’s research first
identified the correlation “with some precision.” Id. at 1295.
221. See id. at 1296 (“The District Court . . . accepted Prometheus’ view that a doctor using
Mayo’s test could violate the patent even if he did not actually alter his treatment decision in the
light of the test.”).
222. See id. at 1297. According to the court, the “wherein” clause “at most add[s] a
suggestion that [a doctor] should take [the natural correlation] into account when treating his
patient . . . while trusting [doctors] to use [the information] appropriately.” Id.
223. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 1293–94.
227. See id. at 1294.
228. Id.
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a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive
concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent on the natural law itself.”229 In this
case, the process claims included no such “inventive concept.” The
claims included, in addition to the natural correlation between
metabolite levels and appropriate dosages, only the administration of
the drugs and the blood tests needed to detect the metabolites. The
additional elements constituted “well understood, routine, conventional
activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field.”230
Mayo, like Classen, could have adhered to a binary
principle/application model of unpatentable subject matter while still
rejecting a claim that amounts to little more than a reference to a natural
correlation. Without the concrete utility that comes with altered
treatment, the process is not genuinely an application of a natural law.
On the other hand, it would have been so easy to add the step of
adjusting the dosage that the court might have deemed the addition a
matter of the “draftsman’s art.”231 In substance, the claim would still
have covered all useful applications of the natural correlation, thereby
preempting, as a practical matter, a “basic tool of research.”232 Instead
the court relied on a penumbral model of unpatentable subject matter,
wherein a natural law must be “transformed” by the addition of “other
elements” that are themselves “inventive.” Those “other elements”
cannot be “well-understood, routine, [or] conventional.” It is not
enough that a natural law be practically applied, it must also by
applied—so it seems—by means that are novel or nonobvious.233 Were
Judge Rich still alive, he might accuse the Supreme Court of, once
again, confusing one “door” to patentability with another.
In some respects, Mayo did not present a good case for clarifying
the intersection between unpatentable natural laws and patentable
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 1297 (“If a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is a process reciting a
law of nature, unless that process has additional features that provide practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.”).
232. The court observed that “[a]nyone who wants to make use of these laws” must
administer the drug and measure the metabolite concentrations; consequently, the claimed process
“amounts to nothing significantly more than an instruction to doctors to apply the applicable laws
when treating their patients.” Id. at 1298. It seems equally clear that anyone wanting to “make
use” of the natural correlation would also have to adjust the dosage when the tests showed
adjustment to be appropriate.
233. The court relied on Flook for the proposition that “conventional or obvious” presolution or post-solution activity is not enough to “transform an unpatentable law of nature into a
patent eligible application of such a law.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
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applications. The claims in Mayo do appear to be products of the
“draftsman’s art,” not because of what they include, but because of
what they omit. One would expect a process claim to include the final
step that makes the process useful, as the claims in Diehr ended with
the production of perfectly-cured rubber. The real-world benefit of the
process described in Mayo would come with the adjustment of the
dosage, so that a patient receiving too large a dosage would be relieved
of harmful side-effects, or a patient receiving too little would be given
effective treatment. The patentee may have left out that step so that
firms conducting tests on behalf of a doctor, but not themselves
directing treatment, could be sued more easily.234 In any event, we have
claims covering steps already in use (the administration of the drug,
and the tests to measure metabolites) with the only addition being
information about what the test results mean. Even if that information
was new, the correlation between certain measurements and the need
for more or less medicine would have been inherent all along—in the
same way that a certain quantity of energy was always equivalent to a
certain quantity of mass, even before Einstein revealed the formula
E=mc2 that makes the quantity known. Accordingly, if the
“administering” and “determining” steps were indeed “routine and
conventional,” and the “wherein” element added only information
about what was already there, then the claims could have been, and
perhaps should have been, rejected on grounds of novelty, rather than
patentable subject matter.
A better Mayo case would have included some claims that
included the adjustment of the dosage. Then the court could have
explained whether the process of treatment as a whole, improved by a
new understanding of a natural correlation, constituted patentable
subject matter (as Diehr would suggest), or whether the obviousness of
adjusting the dosage when the correlation was understood, or the fact
that all practical uses of the natural correlation were still preempted,
meant that the process was not patent-eligible.235 Instead, we are left
with unanswered questions about the role of “conventional” steps in

234. Or the intention might have been to cover situations where the tests showed no need to
adjust the dosage.
235. The court did not decide whether the subject matter would still have been ineligible if
the steps that accompanied the natural law had been “less conventional.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302.
The court did volunteer that “typical patent[s] on . . . a new way of using an existing drug” more
successfully “confine their reach to particular applications of [natural] laws.” Id. If the claim in
Mayo had called for an adjustment of the dosage, perhaps that would qualify as “as new way of
using” thiopurine drugs, and one qualifying as a “particular application” of the natural correlation.
We cannot be sure.
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determining patentable subject matter, and ambiguity as to whether a
binary principle/application model or a penumbral model of
unpatentable subject matter is the correct one to apply.
IV. PATENTABLE INVENTIONS AND PHENOMENA OF NATURE
Mayo could be said to involve both natural laws and natural
phenomena. The correlation between metabolites and an effective
dosage is a natural law, and the process that causes the body to produce
metabolites is, in the court’s words, “an entirely natural process.”236
But the natural law is a “relation [that] exists in principle apart from
any human action.”237 In contrast, the process is dependent on “human
action” through the administration of thiopurine drugs. Nature supplies
the potential, but it requires a human being to set things in motion. In
another type of case, a phenomenon exists in nature without human
intervention, and the question is whether, and to what extent, a human
who has discovered its existence or put it to use can claim the rights of
an inventor. The phenomenon might be a pre-existing material, like
uranium, a pre-existing process, like photosynthesis, or a pre-existing
force, like electricity. From the beginning, courts have held that a
patent-eligible invention must involve more than the discovery of a
natural phenomenon. Hence, when a patent applicant claims a process
or composition of matter that is subtly altered from its natural
counterpart, courts must draw difficult distinctions.
A. The Early Cases
Once again, the story begins in the nineteenth century. Some of
the early cases discuss “powers” that exist in nature without human
intervention. Le Roy states that no one can claim an exclusive right to
steam, electricity, or “any other power in nature, which is alike open to
all.”238 Invention is not a matter of discovering such powers, but of
“applying them to useful objects.”239 Specifically, one can patent the
methods devised “to extract, modify, and concentrate natural
agencies”240 so that they can be used to advantage. The Telephone
Cases,241 involving Alexander Graham Bell’s patents, support the same
distinction. Bell claimed a “method of, and apparatus for, transmitting
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id. at 1297.
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853).
Id.
Id.
126 U.S. 1 (1888).
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vocal or other sounds telegraphically . . . by causing electrical
undulations, similar in form to the vibrations of the air accompanying
the said vocal or other sounds.”242 Electricity exists in nature, but “left
to itself, [it] will not do what is wanted.”243 Bell did not claim
“electricity in its natural state as it comes from the battery,” claiming
instead a means for “chang[ing] . . . its condition,” by altering its
intensity to correspond to sound vibrations, so that it could serve as the
medium for transmitting speech.244 Bell could patent his method of
controlling the force of electricity to accomplish his purpose.245 In fact,
even if sounds could be transmitted through electricity only in the
manner invented by Bell, the court would not deny him a patent, but
commend him on the significance of his discovery.246
When a force of nature has to be controlled by an apparatus to
make it useful, nature supplies the potential and the inventor the
realization. The separation of potential and realization invites an
analysis for forces of nature similar to what we have seen for principles
of nature, and cases like Le Roy and the Telephone Cases treat them as
the same. On the other hand, cases involving tangible materials found
in nature look somewhat different.
An early example is Ex Parte Latimer, concerning the extraction
of fibers from the needles of the Pinus australis tree.247 The inventor
successfully patented his method of extracting the fibers, but not the
fibers themselves. The applicant’s discovery was “unquestionably very
valuable” and of “immense benefit to the people of the country in
which the Pinus australis grows.”248 The fiber was stronger, more
durable, and cheaper to produce than others used in fabrics, and likely
to take their place in manufacturing.249 But the applicant did not claim
that the fibers had been changed in any way in the process of
extraction.250 Freed from their natural context, the fibers were still

242. Id. at 531.
243. Id. at 532.
244. Id. at 534.
245. Id.
246. “It may be that electricity cannot be used at all for the transmission of speech except in
the way Bell has discovered, and that therefore, practically, his patent gives him its exclusive use
for that purpose, but that does not make his claim one for the use of electricity distinct from the
particular process with which it is connected in his patent. It will, if true, show more clearly the
great importance of his discovery, but it will not invalidate his patent.” Id. at 535.
247. Ex Parte Latimer, 1889 DEC. COMM’R PAT. 123, 125 (1889).
248. Id. at 127.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 125.
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“essentially the same thing.”251 Although the fibers were useful, they
could not be patented:
[T]he mere ascertaining of the character or quality of trees that grow
in the forest and the construction of the woody fiber and tissue of
which they are composed is not a patentable invention . . . any more
than to find a new gem or jewel in the earth would entitle the
discoverer to patent all gems which should be subsequently
found.252

The court described the fibers as something that “nature has
produced” and that “nature has intended to be equally for the use of all
men.”253 If Latimer were allowed to patent the fibers of the Pinus
australis, then patents might be granted thereafter on all “the trees of
the forest and the plants of the earth, which of course would be
unreasonable and impossible.”254
Latimer made a valuable discovery, but he could not claim the
natural fibers or their inherent properties as his invention. Courts have
never deviated from that principle. In the 1930s, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals held that ductile uranium was not patentable:
“[u]ranium is a product of nature and the appellant is not entitled to a
patent on the same, or upon any of the natural qualities of that metal.”255
In Funk Bros., the Supreme Court held that the natural characteristics
of certain strains of Rhizobium bacteria (to function without inhibiting
other strains) were not the patentee’s invention.256 Those characteristics
were “the work of nature.”257 Researchers who discover new plants,
minerals, or bacteria often make contributions to human welfare, but
not the sort of contributions that are rewarded with patents. In contrast,
the bacteria at issue in Chakrabarty—produced in the laboratory
though genetic engineering—had the ability to break down oil spills in
a manner possessed by no naturally-occurring species.258 This
“markedly different characteristic” served to distinguish the humanmade invention from the handiwork of nature.259
251. Id.
252. Id. at 125.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. In re Marden, 47 F.2d 957, 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931); see also In re Marden, 47 F.2d 958,
959 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (holding that ductility of vanadium is “a quality of a natural product and as
such is not patentable”).
256. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1948).
257. Id. at 130.
258. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
259. Id. at 310.
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B. Nature Processed and Purified
Although all machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter
are made of raw materials found in nature, usually they have been
processed to a degree that makes it easy to distinguish a human-made
invention from its natural components. The difficult cases are the ones
where the raw ingredients have been minimally processed—perhaps
only by removing those ingredients from their natural environment, as
Latimer extracted the fibers from the needles of the Pinus australis.260
A subject-matter distinction based solely on potential and application
might suggest that the extracted fibers are an invention; in their original
context of pine needles, those fibers can hardly have been useful in
manufacturing. Yet few things in nature are useful until removed, in
some way, from their natural environment. Fruit must be picked, ores
must be mined, and so forth. If removing products of nature from their
surroundings were enough to constitute an invention, then, in the
context of tangible things, the prohibition on patenting natural
phenomena would mean little.
Even combining products of nature in new ways, where their
natural characteristics can find additional utility, may be treated as
nothing more than a change of context. In Funk Bros., the combination
of mutually non-inhibiting strains of bacteria was not found in nature,
and the combination, useable on a variety of crops, provided a more
valuable product.261 But the advantages of the combination were
attributed to the natural characteristics of the bacteria. They were not,
in the court’s view, the product of invention; they were “no more than
the discovery of some of the handiwork of nature.”262
In many cases, courts have relied on physical differences to
distinguish an invention from a product of nature. In Latimer, the court
observed that the process of removing the fibers from the needles
produced “no chemical combination . . . by which the fiber becomes
something new or different from the fiber in its natural state.”263
Because the fibers were not made stronger or given any other
characteristic not found in nature, “in selecting and obtaining [these
fibers] from the trees the applicant has done little more than one who
gathers the pebbles along the seashore, where the forces of nature have
placed them.”264 Similarly, in American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Ex Parte Latimer, 1889 DEC. COMM’R PAT. 123, 125 (1889).
See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131–32.
Id. at 131.
Ex Parte Latimer, 1889 DEC. COMM’R PAT. at 126.
Id.
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Co., the Supreme Court held that the addition of borax to the rind of
fresh oranges—a step that protected the fruit from the development of
mold—did not produce a patentable “manufacture.”265 The
combination of borax and the natural rind did not give those materials
“a new or distinctive form, quality, or property.”266 The fruit did not
undergo any change in its “name, appearance, or general character.”267
It was still “a fresh orange fit only for the same beneficial uses as
before.”268
The result in American Fruit Growers is questionable. If the
treated fruit were more resistant to mold, they did have a new and
distinctive property compared to oranges found in nature. The court
may have been influenced by its focus on the term “manufacture.” The
court had dealt with the term previously in Hartranft v. Wiegmann,
where the question was whether seashells that had been treated with
acid and polished by an emery wheel (to expose “the brilliant inner
layer”) were products of manufacturing.269 The polished shells were
found to be “still shells” because “[t]hey had not been manufactured
into a new and different article, having a distinctive name, character or
use.”270 Like those shells, the oranges in American Fruit Growers had
not been “tranform[ed]” into “a new and different article” with “a
distinctive name, character, and use.”271 They were still, basically,
oranges. Hartranft, which has been cited in a number of patent cases,
was actually a tax case.272 The term “manufactures” was at issue
because “manufactures of shell” were subject to an import duty that did
not apply to shells as such.273 Although tax law and patent law have the
word “manufacture” in common, one could doubt whether the policy
considerations are the same, particularly when the Patent Act also
includes the alternative category “composition of matter.”274 This term,
on its face, covers articles that have not been “transformed” in any way.
Some of the most difficult cases involve products of nature that
have been purified in the laboratory. Purification can be viewed as
either a process of extracting a natural material from its surroundings,
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

283 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1931).
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id.
121 U.S. 609, 613–14 (1887).
Id. at 615.
283 U.S. at 13.
Hartranft, 121 U.S. at 613–14.
Id. at 613.
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2013).
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or as a process that creates a new material—at least in cases where the
process creates a material of greater purity than can be found in nature.
Some courts have held that in instances of purification it is not physical
differences that matter (other than the purification itself), but whether
the purified material offers practical benefits that the unpurified
material does not. In Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., Judge
Learned Hand held that crystals of purified adrenalin, derived from
glandular tissues, were a patentable invention.275 The patentee was “the
first to make it available for any use by removing it from the other
gland-tissue in which it was found,” so that it “became for every
practical purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically.”276
Although, in spite of Latimer, Judge Hand found “no rule” that
products “extracted . . . without change” are unpatentable, in this case
the “ample practical differences” demonstrated that the patentee’s
crystals were “not merely the old dried glands in a purer state.”277 Judge
Hand cautioned that “[t]he line between different substances and the
same substance is to be drawn rather from the common usages of men
than from nice considerations of dialectic.”278
The Fourth Circuit reached similar conclusions in Merck & Co.,
Inc. v. Olin Matheison Chemical Corp.,279 a case involving vitamin
B12. The same chemical substance could be found in natural
fermentates, but in such minute quantities that it had “no utility,
therapeutically or commercially.”280 The court observed that all
tangible things are “products of nature in the sense that nature provides
the basic source materials.”281 That a new product was the result of the
“extraction, concentration and purification” of materials found in
nature did not make it ineligible for patenting.282 The purified form of
B12 was a product of great utility, compared to which the natural
fermentates were “wholly useless.”283 The “step from complete
275. 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., 196 F. 496
(2d Cir. 1912).
276. Id. at 103.
277. Id.; see also Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701, 705 (7th Cir.
1910) (medicine that was sufficiently purified to make it “therapeutically available” was a
patentable invention, even though “lifted out of a mass [a material created by other researchers]
that contained, chemically, the compound;” the patentee had caused the mass “to yield something
to the useful arts.”).
278. Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 103.
279. 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958).
280. Id. at 161.
281. Id. at 162.
282. Id. at 163.
283. Id. at 164.
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uselessness to great and perfected utility is a long one,” and a step that,
as a practical matter, created an entirely new product.284
In other instances, courts have been skeptical of substances that
are improved by purification, but not changed in character. In In re
Merz,285 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that purification
of a known material did not create a patentable invention unless the
purified substance differed from its source in kind, rather than in
degree.286 While the purified ultramarine dye at issue in Merz was
brighter and more desirable, it had the same essential utility as its
unpurified counterpart. In re King287 concerned vitamin C, a substance
found naturally in foods and that had been used for centuries, in the
form of lemon juice, to prevent and treat scurvy.288 The applicant was
first to determine the chemical properties of vitamin C and to isolate it
in a concentrated form suitable for use as a food additive.289 However,
because lemon juice contained the same substance and had long been
employed for the same purpose, the purified form did not constitute a
patentable invention.290 It is significant that in these cases the source
materials were not “wholly useless” in their unpurified form, nor was
their utility unknown in the art.
While the cases on purified materials raise some doubts, courts
have generally adhered to the principle that merely separating a product
of nature from its natural environment does not create a patent-eligible
invention. In Bergy, the court confirmed that Latimer still provides an
accurate statement of the law.291 A product of nature “freed from its
surroundings” cannot be patented.292
C. Myriad
Today, attention has shifted to DNA. The DNA molecule, in its
natural form, contains the information that governs inheritance.
Isolated segments of DNA have uses in medicine, including as probes
to detect the presence in a sample of a targeted genetic sequence. In

284. Id.
285. 97 F.2d 599 (C.C.P.A. 1938).
286. Id. at 601.
287. 107 F.2d 618 (C.C.P.A. 1939).
288. See id.
289. Id. at 619. Another scientist had isolated the substance before, but he had not
recognized it as vitamin C. Id.
290. Id. at 620.
291. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
292. Id.
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Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,293 the
patentee, Myriad, claimed isolated human DNA having mutations
associated with susceptibility to breast and ovarian cancer.294 The
isolated DNA can be used to identify patients who have an elevated
risk of developing the disease. Some of Myriad’s claims covered
molecules identical to their natural counterparts, except for their
separation from a longer strand of nucleotides. Other claims covered
equivalent cDNA—molecules including the same genetic information,
but synthesized in the laboratory from different components, and
omitting the “introns” that do not code for proteins.295 The issue was
whether the isolated DNA sequences, or their cDNA counterparts, were
products of nature or patentable inventions.
The Federal Circuit produced three opinions, each illustrating a
distinct approach to patentable subject matter. Judge Lourie found that
the isolated genes were patent-eligible compositions of matter—
“product[s] of human ingenuity”296—primarily because physical
differences distinguished the invention from naturally-occurring
DNA.297 The severing of covalent bonds created a molecule with a
“distinctive chemical identity.”298 Judge Moore reached the same
result, but rather than emphasizing physical or chemical changes, she
stressed the practical applications made possible by isolation of the
genes—a “new and important utility.”299 Judge Bryson would not have
found the isolated genes eligible for patenting.300 Comparing the
isolated genes to leaves plucked from a tree,301 he would have applied
the same approach to DNA, a natural phenomenon, that the Supreme
Court applied to natural laws in Mayo.302 Specifically, Judge Bryson
would have required an “inventive concept” that added to the naturallyoccurring genes “more than ‘well-understood, routine, conventional’
293. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
294. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2112–13.
295. Id. at 2113.
296. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303,
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
297. Although the isolated sequence coded for the same proteins as the sequence found in
nature, Judge Lourie found the “informational content” of the DNA irrelevant. Id. at 1330. “We
recognize that biologists may think of molecules in terms of their uses, but genes are in fact
materials having a chemical nature and, as such, are best described in patents by their structures
rather than by their functions.” Id.
298. Id. at 1328.
299. See id. at 1341–42 (Moore, J., concurring).
300. Id. at 1348.
301. Id. at 1352 (Bryson, J., concurring).
302. Id. at 1354–55.
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elements.”303 Isolation of the DNA by known techniques fell short of
that “inventive concept.”304 However, Judge Bryson agreed with the
other judges that cDNA, which must be created in the laboratory, is
patent-eligible subject matter.305
The Supreme Court agreed with Judge Bryson that isolated DNA
cannot be patented. Identifying the genes in question was a significant
advancement in knowledge, but that was the essence of Myriad’s
contribution.306 Myriad did not create the genes, and isolating them
from their surroundings was “not an act of invention.”307 The cDNA,
on the other hand, was the product of human ingenuity and, as such,
eligible for patenting.308 In some respects, the brief opinion does not
take us far beyond Latimer, which held in 1889 that products of nature
extracted from their natural surroundings are not patent-eligible
inventions. The court does not call explicitly for an “inventive concept”
to distinguish a patent-eligible invention from a product of nature.
Instead, the opinion suggests a relatively stark distinction between
creation and discovery.309 The cDNA can be patented because it is
“something new” that “the lab technician unquestionably creates.”310
The court does not explore whether creating cDNA is a conventional
or routine step after the target gene has been identified. With respect to
the DNA, the court suggests that one might patent new applications
made possible by the discovery, and it notes that Myriad is in an
“excellent position” to do so.311 Whether such an application would be
judged as though the gene had already been identified, the court does
not explain.312 Although Judge Bryson would have adopted a
penumbral mode of unpatentable subject matter, at the moment there is

303. Id. at 1355.
304. See id.
305. Id. at 1356.
306. .See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117–
18 (2013). “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the
§ 101 inquiry.” Id. at 2117.
307. Id. at 2117.
308. Id. at 2119.
309. Although the court acknowledged that the isolated DNA constituted a “nonnaturally
occurring molecule,” it found that the claims were “not expressed in terms of chemical
composition” and did not “rely in any way on the chemical changes that result from the isolation.”
Id. at 2118. The “focus” of the claims was on the unchanged genetic information. Id.
310. Id. at 2119.
311. Id. at 2119–20.
312. The court does say that if Myriad had used “an innovative method of manipulating
genes,” rather than routine processes for isolating DNA, that “innovative method” might have
been patentable. Id. at 2119.
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little evidence that the Supreme Court will do so in the context of
concrete natural phenomena like DNA.
V. PATENTABLE INVENTIONS AND ABSTRACT IDEAS
After natural laws and natural phenomena, the third category of
unpatentable subject matter is “abstract ideas.” Currently there is much
uncertainty as to what the term “abstract idea” means.313 In the context
of patent claims, “abstract” could refer to an absence of detail or to an
absence of tangible embodiments. A claim to “any electrical generator”
is abstract in the first sense, but each example of a generator within the
scope of the claim would be, by its nature, concrete. In contrast, a claim
to a method of structuring a loan might be quite detailed, but any
embodiment within the scope of the claim would consist of symbols,
financial obligations, and legal consequences—another layer of
intangibles. If we are concerned about patents that are too broad, the
former claim might be most objectionable; if we are concerned about
patents that exceed the traditional bounds of technology, the latter is
more problematic. To further complicate things, “abstract” can also
refer to an absence of utility. If Einstein had claimed E=mc2 without
reference to any practical application, his claim might have been
deemed abstract in that sense. On the other hand, if he had claimed “the
use of E=mc2 in the operation of a nuclear power plant,” the claim
would have lacked detail, but not practical application. Without
defining our terms, we cannot agree on which of these claims embraces
an abstract idea.
Judge Nelson, writing in dissent in Le Roy and referring to the case
involving Neilson’s furnace, concluded that non-utility is the measure
of abstractness.314 An “abstract principle,” he wrote, means “a principle
considered apart from any special purpose or practical operation.”315
When a principle is applied to a useful purpose, “[i]t is no longer an
abstract principle.”316 It becomes “a principle turned to account, to a
practical object, and applied to a special result.”317 In Neilson, the
abstract principle was a fact about nature: that warm air provides more
efficient combustion. The invention was the application of that
principle in a furnace by pre-heating the air, before it enters the
313. See Mark A. Lemley, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2011) (“Put
simply, the problem is that no one understands what makes an idea ‘abstract.’”).
314. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 185 (1853) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
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combustion chamber, in a separate vessel. The patentee did not limit
himself to any particular type of vessel by specifying its size or shape,
or the materials from which it should be made.318 But having crossed
the line from principle to application, the invention was no longer
abstract.
Samuel Morse’s telegraph patent included a claim even less
detailed than Neilson’s. Morse’s eighth claim embraced “the use of the
motive power of the electric or galvanic current . . . however developed
for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any
distances.”319 Disallowing the claim, the majority called attention to its
breadth, and the danger that it would preempt further advancements in
the art:
It is impossible to misunderstand the extent of this claim . . . . If this
claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process or
machinery the result is accomplished. For aught that we now know
some future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover
a mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric
or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or
combination set forth in the plaintiff's specification. His invention
may be less complicated—less liable to get out of order—less
expensive in construction, and in its operation. But yet if it is
covered by this patent the inventor could not use it, nor the public
have the benefit of it without the permission of this patentee.320

Dissenting Judge Grier argued that Morse’s claim, like Neilson’s,
was not abstract. In spite of its breadth,321 the claim covered no more
than a useful application of the natural forces of electro-magnetism.
Reverting to the principle/application dichotomy, Grier wrote that one
“who takes this new element or power, as yet useless, from the
laboratory of the philosopher, and makes it the servant of man . . . is
the benefactor to whom the patent law tenders its protection.”322 If
Morse’s “art” consisted of “compelling this hitherto useless element,”
electricity, to convey printed messages at a distance, “how can it be
said that the claim is for a principle or an abstraction?”323
318. Neilson v. Harford, 51 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1274 (Exch. Of Pleas) (1841).
319. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112 (1854).
320. Id. at 112–13.
321. Grier viewed the claim, unlimited as it was, as nothing more than Morse’s “whole
invention.” Id. at 135 (Grier, J., dissenting). If other inventors improved upon Morse’s “art,” they
could obtain their own patents—an arrangement that had not been found to hinder the advance of
technology in the case of patented machines. Id. at 134.
322. Id. at 132–33.
323. Id. at 135.
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In fact, it is not clear that even the majority viewed Morse’s claim
as one to “a principle or an abstraction.” Their complaint was that
Morse’s claim was broader than what his detailed disclosures showed
to be his invention.324 Morse claimed “a manner and process which he
has not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not
describe when he obtained his patent.”325 The court distinguished
Neilson as a case in which the vessel might be built in any number of
ways, and “all of them would produce the effect in greater or less
degrees.”326 Anyone who employed an air-heating vessel, no matter
how they did it, would be taking advantage of Neilson’s advancement.
Morse, in contrast, claimed his invention in terms of a result—
transmitting messages by electricity. Others who obtained the same
result might do so by entirely different means, so Morse’s disclosures
could not justify such a broad claim. Today, such overbreadth might be
treated as a failure to satisfy the written description or enablement
requirements.327
The association of abstract ideas with non-utility did not end with
Morse. In In re Alappat, the Federal Circuit defined “abstract ideas” as
“disembodied concepts or truths which are not ‘useful’ from a practical
standpoint standing alone, i.e., they are not ‘useful’ until reduced to
some practical application.”328 However, breadth and preemption—the
qualities singled out in Morse—have become more prominent markers
of unpatentable subject matter. In Benson, the court did not deny that
the applicant’s mathematical algorithm for converting one form of
binary number to another could be usefully applied.329 The problem lay
in the breadth of the claim. It was “so abstract and sweeping as to cover
both known and unknown uses of the BCD to binary conversion.”330
The algorithm might be used to operate a train, verify drivers’ licenses,
or research legal precedents, and it might be performed with machinery
yet to be invented, or no machinery at all.331 Because the applicant had
not limited himself to a particular use of the mathematical algorithm,
his claim was too abstract to be patented.
The Supreme Court addressed abstract ideas in Bilski v. Kappos,
where the patentee claimed a method of hedging risks for buyers and
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. at 113.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 115–16.
See supra Part I.B.
33 F.3d at 1526, 1542 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972).
Id.
See id.
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sellers of energy market commodities by engaging the services of a
middleman.332 With little explanation, the court identified risk-hedging
itself as an “abstract idea.”333 Although the claims limited the use of
risk-hedging to certain markets, the court found that even “limiting an
abstract idea to one field of use or adding token post solution
components [does] not make the concept patentable.”334 The claims in
Bilski added nothing to the underlying abstract idea other than “the use
of well known random analysis techniques.”335 The authority on which
the court principally relied was Flook, which had been similarly
dismissive of field-of-use limitations and “token” additions
representative of “the draftsman’s art.” Justice Stevens, in a concurring
opinion, criticized the majority for inadequately defining “abstract
ideas,” and for seeming to interject into the subject matter inquiry
considerations of indefiniteness and novelty.336
The Federal Circuit has often dealt with cases like Bilski involving
endeavors far removed from the industrial settings traditionally
associated with patentable inventions. Inventions today often
manipulate information, rather than the forces of nature. The intangible
quality of the subject matter makes concerns of abstractness difficult to
avoid. In such cases, the Federal Circuit, focusing on preemption, has
looked for some “meaningful limits” imposed by the use of computers
or other technology.337 In SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission,338 the court found that the claimed methods could not be
performed without a GPS receiver, and that the necessity of such a
receiver “place[d] a meaningful limit on the scope of the claims.”339 In
Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., the patent claimed
a computer-implemented system for stabilizing the value of employee
life insurance policies owned by corporations and banks.340 Here the
court did not find that the use of a computer was “integral to the claimed
invention, facilitating the process in a way that a person making
calculations or computations could not.”341
332. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599 (2010).
333. Id. at 611–12.
334. Id. at 612.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 620–21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
337. The Federal Circuit’s earlier attempt to limit patentable process claims to those that
work a physical transformation, or that require a particular machine, was rejected by the Supreme
Court in Bilski. Id. at 602–03.
338. 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
339. SiRF Technology, 601 F.3d at 1332–33.
340. See 687 F.3d 1266, 1269–70 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
341. Id. at 1278; see also Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1323
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The Federal Circuit’s emphasis on “meaningful limitations”
leaves one question unresolved: does anything that restricts the scope
of claim suffice, or must a patentee add something “inventive” to the
abstract idea—something, other than the idea itself, that is
unconventional or nonobvious? In other words, does the penumbral
model of unpatentable subject matter, associated in Mayo with laws of
nature, apply equally to abstract ideas?342 The Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International suggests that it
does.343
The patents in Alice concern a method of eliminating “settlement
risk”—the risk that one party to a transaction will fail to meet its
obligations—through the use of a trusted intermediary.344 In this case,
the intermediary generates “shadow” records reflecting the current
assets of the transacting parties in real-world financial institutions, and
permits transactions only in cases where the records demonstrate the
existence of sufficient resources.345 In the end, it compels the financial
institutions to execute the transfers necessary to meet the parties’
obligations.346 The patent included claims to the method itself and to a
computer programmed to carry it out.347
The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision elicited seven separate
opinions.348 The brief per curiam opinion found all the claims ineligible
for patenting.349 Of the remaining opinions, Judge Lourie’s
concurrence was the most ambitious. He called for a “consistent,
cohesive, and accessible approach to the § 101 analysis”350 based on
the concept of preemption. Patent claims, he wrote, should not preempt
“fundamental principle[s].”351 Accordingly, a claim premised on an
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that the “basic character” of a claim to an abstract idea “is not changed
by claiming only its performance on computers;” the machine “must impose meaningful limits on
the claim’s scope.” (citations omitted)).
342. Judge Mayer of the Federal Circuit, following the lead of Bilski and Mayo, argued that
the disclosure of “conventional computer technology” could not make patent-eligible an otherwise
abstract idea; what is needed is “new technology or [an] ‘inventive concept.’” Highmark, Inc. v.
Allcare Health Management Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting in part).
343. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
344. Id. at 2349.
345. Id. at 2351.
346. Id.
347. See id. at 2349.
348. See CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc).
349. Id. at 1273.
350. Id. at 1277 (Lourie, J., concurring).
351. “Guarding against wholesale preemption of fundamental principles should be our
primary aim.” Id. at 1281.
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abstract idea must include “substantive limitations that . . . add
‘significantly more’ to the basic principle, with the result that the claim
covers significantly less.”352 Although the limitation may be called an
“inventive concept,” we are not looking for ingenuity or
nonobviousness.353 What we are looking for is a “genuine human
contribution”354 sufficient to “materially narrow[] the claims relative to
the abstract idea they embrace.”355
Judge Rader’s concurring opinion put less emphasis on breadth
and more on the principle/application dichotomy. Referring to the
Neilson case, Judge Rader observed that “the abstract ideas exception
deals not merely with breadth, because the ‘hot air’ claims were broad
and covered many ‘mechanical arrangements’ but yet [were] found
patent eligible.”356 The question is “whether the claim seeks to patent
an idea itself, rather than an application of that idea.”357 However, this
still turns on the presence of “meaningful limitations” that prevent the
claim from covering every application of an abstract idea.358 While the
Supreme Court in Mayo referred to “routine” or “conventional” steps
as inadequate to constitute an “inventive concept,” Judge Rader viewed
this as merely “shorthand” for discounting steps that one would
“necessarily use” whenever applying a fundamental principle.359
The Supreme Court affirmed, explicitly adapting its Mayo
framework to the question of whether a patent claim based on an
abstract idea is eligible for patenting.360 In order to distinguish a patenteligible application of an abstract idea from the idea itself, one must
determine whether the claim includes an “inventive concept”—
352. Id. at 1281 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 123 S. Ct.
1289, 1294 (2012)). “With the pertinent abstract idea identified, the balance of the claim can be
evaluated to determine whether it contains additional substantive limitations that narrow, confine,
or otherwise tie down the claim so that, in practical terms, it does not cover the abstract idea
itself.” Id. at 1282.
353. Id. at 1284. Although the Supreme Court, in Bilski and Mayo, dismissed additions that
were conventional or routine, according to Judge Lourie it was not the lack of novelty that
mattered but the failure of those limitations to avoid “a claim that effectively covers the natural
law or abstract idea itself.” Id.
354. Id. at 1283.
355. Id. at 1286.
356. Id. at 1299 (Rader,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
357. Id.
358. “The relevant inquiry must be whether a claim includes meaningful limitations
restricting it to an application, rather than merely an abstract idea.” Id.
359. Id. at 1303. “If, to implement the abstract concept, one must perform the additional
step, then the step merely separately restates an element of the abstract idea, and thus does not
further limit the abstract concept to a practical application.” Id. (emphasis in original).
360. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2349–50 (2014).
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described here as “additional features” ensuring that the claim is more
than a drafting exercise designed monopolize the idea itself.361
Although (regrettably) the court did not “labor to delimit the precise
contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category,”362 it found “no meaningful
distinction” between the idea of intermediated settlement and the risk
hedging found to be abstract in Bilski.363 The court also found that
limiting the idea to implementation via a programmed computer—a
limitation amounting to “[s]tating [the] abstract idea while adding the
words ‘apply it with a computer’”—did not supply the missing element
needed for patent eligibility.364
The Court refers to the computer needed to carry out the claimed
invention as “generic.”365 While this may suggest that the claims, like
those in Benson, were too broad, the court also observes that the
functions performed by the computer, like electronic record-keeping,
are “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional.”366 The patentee did
not purport to have “improve[d] the functioning of the computer itself,”
nor did the invention “affect an improvement in any other technology
or technical field.”367 In the end, “the claims at issue amount[ed] to
‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply the abstract
idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic
computer,” and that was not ‘enough’ to transform [the] abstract idea
into a patent-eligible invention.”368 The use of a “generic” computer
did not supply the “inventive concept” that the court demanded.369 As
in Mayo, the court seems to say that it is not the usefulness of the
combination that determines whether it is patentable, but whether
ingenuity can be found in something other than the abstract idea itself.
If implementing the intermediated settlement required novel
programming techniques, and the claims were limited accordingly, it
seems likely that the court would have found the combination eligible
for patenting.

361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Id. at 2357.
Id.
Id. (“Both are squarely within the realm of ‘abstract ideas’ as we have used that term.”).
Id. at 2358.
Id. at 2350.
Id. at 2359.
Id. at 2351.
Id.
Id. at 2350.
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VI. THE APPEAL OF SYNTHESIS AND THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE
PENUMBRAL MODEL
One can sense in Judge Lourie’s call for a “consistent, cohesive,
and accessible approach to the § 101 analysis”370 a longing for some
kind of grand synthesis that would address all the three exceptions to
patentable subject matter—natural laws, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas—in a common framework. In recent years, the Supreme
Court has heard four subject matter cases. Two cases, Bilski and Alice,
involved abstract ideas;371 another one, Mayo, involved natural laws;372
and one, Myriad, involved natural phenomena.373 Each decision relies
on the same body of law and invokes the same policy concerns—
namely, that invention receives adequate reward, but that the “basic
tools” of inquiry be spared from preemption. In two of these three
contexts—abstract ideas and natural phenomena—the Supreme Court
used the term “inventive concept” to describe the additional something
that distinguishes a patent-eligible invention from its ineligible
counterpart.374 Judge Bryson would have applied the same “inventive
concept” standard to the natural phenomena of human DNA.375
If there is in fact one key to all varieties of unpatentable subject
matter, and that key is the notion of an “inventive concept,” we might
achieve a symmetry in patent law that is simple and elegant. On the
novelty side, prior art would not be patentable, nor would variations on
prior art that one of ordinary skill could achieve. On the subject matter
side, fundamental truths would not be patentable, nor would
applications of those truths that were not “inventive.” We could go so
far as to define laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
as common law categories of prior art, to coexist with statutory
categories like prior patents and publications. To complete the
symmetry, we merely have to define the “inventive concept” that
distinguishes a fundamental principle from a patentable invention as a
non-obvious leap. Flook paved the way by dismissing the notion that
“post-solution activity, no matter how . . . obvious in itself, can
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process.”376

370. CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(Lourie, J., concurring).
371. See discussion supra Part V.
372. See discussion supra Part III.E.
373. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
374. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
375. Myriad, 689 F.3d at 1355 (Bryson, J., concurring).
376. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
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Obviousness is, in many respects, the central concept of the 1952
Patent Act, and unlike many other standards in patent law, it is a
relatively concrete measure. Obviousness depends on what a person of
ordinary skill would have thought, and it can be evaluated through
objective evidence—the so-called “secondary considerations” that
include commercial success, long-felt need, and near-simultaneous
invention.377 In this way, novelty and patentable subject matter could
be linked by a common penumbral model. As one who has advocated
a role for obviousness in infringement’s doctrine of equivalents,378 I
cannot deny the intuitive appeal of this kind of scheme.
Unfortunately, the problems with synthesis in this case outweigh
the potential benefits. The first problem is that patentable subject matter
is one area of patent law that is not designed to deal in matters of
degree. A claim might be somewhat indefinite, or an improvement
almost obvious, but an invention cannot be somewhat a process or
almost a composition of matter. Section 101’s use of the expansive
terms “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,” with
the comprehensive “any,” suggests that subject matter was intended to
be a “coarse filter”379 with little ambiguity. Two of the exceptions
created by the courts can only be either/or propositions. One might
argue over definitions, but something is a law of nature or a natural
phenomenon, or it is not. It cannot be almost a law of nature, or barely
a natural phenomenon. The concept of obviousness inherently involves
blurred lines and matters of degree; subject matter does not. The one
exception is “abstract idea.” An idea, or a patent claim, can be abstract
to a certain extent. In fact, all claims are abstract to a certain extent,380
so if “abstract idea” is a subject matter category, one must ask how
abstract a claim must be to fall in the forbidden category. This is one
clue that “abstract idea” does not belong here.
Further problems arise if the transition from a fundamental
principle to a patentable invention requires the addition of something
non-obvious (or unconventional, non-routine, or not “well-known”).
As Judge Rich argued in Bergy, except for the inclusion of the word
“new” in § 101, the Patent Act is designed to segregate patentable
subject matter from novelty and nonobviousness.381 If one tried to
377. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 655 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
378. See Alan L. Durham, Patent Symmetry, 87 B.U. L. REV. 969, 1019 (2007).
379. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1066 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
380. See Alan L. Durham, The Paradox of “Abstract Ideas,” 2011 UTAH L. REV. 797, 843.
381. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960–61 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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patent a device long in use, or an obvious variant of a device long in
use, the fact that it was a device would be enough by itself to clear the
subject matter hurdle. When one turns to the provisions that deal with
novelty and obviousness, they make no reference to natural laws,
natural phenomena, or abstract ideas. Obviousness under § 103 is
premised on the prior art of § 102, all of which is human-made, and all
of which makes, or will make, knowledge of the invention available to
the public.382 If Congress had included natural laws and natural
phenomena as categories of prior art, regardless of whether they were
known, the logic behind the obviousness inquiry would have suffered.
We would have to pretend that a person of ordinary skill in the art had
information that no one skilled in the art possessed. The secondary
considerations would be useless. Factors like commercial success and
long-felt need can demonstrate whether something was actually
obvious, but not whether something would have been obvious if an
undiscovered law of nature or natural phenomenon had been known.
On reflection, it seems Congress had good reasons for not including
pre-existing natural laws and phenomena in § 102.
This is not to say that it would be impossible to include a purely
hypothetical obviousness inquiry in our § 101 analysis. References
used today to demonstrate obviousness under § 103 may be so obscure
that the inquiry is already mostly hypothetical.383 Even “secret prior
art” can be the basis of a finding of obviousness, an example being a
prior patent application that had not yet been published.384 Although no
one in the art, other than the applicant, had access to the information, it
is fair game for obviousness because the information was on a path to
public disclosure. Hence we could, with some difficulty, imagine
whether an application of a natural law, natural phenomenon, or
abstract idea would have been obvious had the underlying principle
been known, even in cases where it was yet to be discovered. The
bigger problem is how this approach would disregard the nature of
invention.
As the Supreme Court said in Mayo, “all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
382. Id. at 965 n.7 (“Basically, the concept of prior art is that which is publicly known, or at
least known to someone who has taken steps which do make it known to the public.”).
383. See, e.g., Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(holding that illustrations in a Canadian patent application that related to cancelled claims, and
that were omitted from the patent that issued, were still sufficiently accessible to the public to
constitute prior art); In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (a single catalogued thesis in
a German library was sufficiently accessible to the art to constitute a printed publication).
384. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(2), (d) (2013).
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phenomena, or abstract ideas.”385 The Wright brothers’ airplane flew
because of the laws of aerodynamics. Edison’s light bulb glowed
thanks to the properties of electromagnetism. Invention consists in a
new understanding of what nature can be made to do; in other words,
“if you do this . . . you get that.” Discovery and invention go hand in
hand. Discoveries reveal what nature allows; inventions apply that
understanding in a useful way. The potential exists in nature before it
is concretely applied (the principles of aerodynamics came before the
building of the airplane), but as an act, or a state of mind, discovery
does not precede invention. They are one and the same. Both the
Constitution, awarding to “inventors” the rights to their “discoveries,”
and § 101, referring to “[w]hoever invents or discovers,” suggest the
connection. If, in evaluating patentable subject matter, we try to
separate the discovery from the invention, we are missing the point. For
example, the invention in Le Roy—a method of uniting lead under heat
and pressure—was inseparable from the discovery that lead is capable
of uniting under heat and pressure.386 If we treat the discovery as a
given, and dismiss the invention as an obvious application, then we
discount what was, at the time, a significant advancement in
metallurgy.
On the other hand, the reluctance to allow patents on things that
already exist in nature is as well-founded as it is long-enduring. One
cannot “invent” what is already there. Moreover, the benefits of
nature’s handiwork may already be enjoyed. Even before nuclear
fusion was understood as a natural phenomenon, it gave us sunlight.
The policy objective of the patent laws—encouraging the advancement
of the useful arts—does not support awarding rights to what already
exists. It would be inconsistent, as well, with § 101’s reference to
patenting only that which is “new.” Although Judge Rich gave little
significance to that word,387 it does fill a gap if interpreted to exclude
from patenting things that already exist, but that are not within one of
the human-made prior art categories of § 102.
With respect to natural laws, the key to resolving the tension—
between recognizing the role of discovery in invention, and avoiding
patents to what is already there—is the ancient distinction between
principle and application. Natural laws include what nature can do, but
is not doing already. An inventor who discovers the potential, and by
that discovery makes possible a new and useful application, has a
385.
386.
387.

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853).
See supra Part III.D.
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legitimate claim to a patent. The reasoning in Mayo, which stresses the
necessity of an “inventive concept” beyond the discovery of nature’s
laws, is therefore off track. If we frame the discovery in Mayo in terms
of a natural law—that certain metabolite levels reflect a need for
different quantities of thiopurine drugs—then a useful application of
that principle, in the form of corrected dosages, should be a patenteligible process. Some elements of that process, like the tests that reveal
the metabolite levels, may be routine already. However, that is not
relevant to whether the process as a whole is patent-eligible. If the
correlation was previously unknown, the process as a whole, including
the corrected dosages, could not have been routine—it was a new and
useful invention. To pretend otherwise ignores how invention occurs.
Laws of nature themselves are not eligible for patenting. They are
not new, or useful, or invented. But applications of those laws in the
form of new and useful processes, machines, manufactures, or
compositions of matter should be patent-eligible. In Mayo, the claimed
invention was not an application of the natural correlation between the
metabolites and the optimal dosage. The claim only referred to
administering the drugs and conducting the tests, “wherein” certain
results indicated the presence of an incorrect dosage.388 Because it did
not specify any changes in treatment, the “wherein” clause did not
embody an application. It was a statement about nature and nothing
more. Moreover, because the drugs and the tests were already known
in the art, nothing about the claimed process was new. Certain test
results always indicated incorrect dosages, even if no one could
correctly interpret them. When a claim refers to a natural law but does
not require that anything be done with it, it lacks the completed utility
that is the mark of an invention.389 The same is true of the Supreme
Court’s hypothetical claim that merely sets forth a natural law and says
“apply it.”390 A claim that invites others to find ways of applying a
natural law does not itself correspond to an application of a natural law.
A claim to an application of a natural law should indicate in some
manner how it is applied, not merely that it is applied.391
388. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297.
389. Similarly, in Flook the claims culminated in the adjustment of an alarm limit—just a
number—with no action, including sounding an alarm or interrupting the process, taken as a
result. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
390. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
391. The simplest tool to deal with a claim that sets out a natural law and invites one to
“apply it” is probably the written description requirement. It is unlikely that any patent disclosure
could demonstrate that the inventor was in possession of every manner of applying a natural law.
See supra Part V.
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With the qualification that application implies concrete utility, the
principle/application dichotomy works well to distinguish between
natural laws, which cannot be invented, and patent-worthy inventions
that rely on natural laws. The most serious objection to this binary
analysis is that a claim to an application of a natural law may be phrased
in such a way that it embraces all practical applications of the law, with
the same effect as a claim to the law itself. One might, therefore, insist
on something extra that imposes “meaningful limits.”392 I will discuss
the issue of breadth separately. The first concern should be
distinguishing between nature and invention, and if the claim genuinely
describes an application—whether it is phrased narrowly or broadly—
the first concern has been dealt with. In Mayo, it would have been easy
enough, from a technological and patent-drafting standpoint, to add a
final element to the claim calling for appropriate adjustments to the
dosage. Issues of breadth aside, that should have been enough to make
a process claim that was eligible for patenting. The novelty or
obviousness of the thiopurine drugs, the tests, or the adjustment of the
dosages should have been issues for §§ 102 and 103 alone.
When we are dealing with natural phenomena rather than natural
laws, the situation is more difficult. A natural phenomenon, as I have
defined it, is something already manifested in nature—like electricity,
pine needles, or human DNA. As is the case where natural laws are
concerned, a person who merely finds what is already there should not
receive a patent; the subject of the discovery is not new, and it is not an
invention. In this case, however, a simple distinction between nature
and invention is harder to maintain. The difference between a natural
law and a patent-eligible process is the difference between potential
and realization. Nature dictates what can be done; a human-invented
process makes it happen. But if we are comparing, for example, pine
needle fibers found in nature to the same fibers extracted in the
laboratory, both are concrete and tangible, and both require further
effort to produce something with real utility. If we must find a
difference to distinguish between nature and invention, what difference
are we looking for?
One answer is to accept any difference at all, but this might lead
to patents on pebbles gathered from the beach, fruit plucked from the
trees, and so forth. Any product of nature separated from its
environment is different in that respect at least. A standard that required
nothing more would, effectively, remove any distinction between those
who invent new things in the laboratory and those discover new things
392.

See supra Part V.

11_ARTICLE_DURHAM (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/30/2015 10:53 PM

MODELS OF UNPATENTABLE SUBJ. MATTER

307

in nature. The tradition behind that distinction is too well-established
to ignore. The Hartranft formula demands “a distinctive name,
character or use” in a patentable manufacture, in comparison to a
product of nature.393 A distinctive “name” is meaningless, and
“character” ambiguous. One could demand physical differences, like
the breaking of the chemical bonds that occurs when fragments of DNA
are removed from their natural context. However, the differences of
opinion in the Federal Circuit’s Myriad decision show that it would be
difficult to agree on how much change is significant.394 There is no
standard by which to measure it. A better answer is to focus, once again,
on utility. In her concurring opinion in Myriad, Judge Moore focused
on the things that one could do with isolated fragments of DNA that
could not be done with the DNA found in nature.395 This, more than an
emphasis on chemical changes, serves to tie the patentable subject
matter analysis to the basic goal of patent law—to advance technology
through the introduction of new utility.
The concept of inherency could play an important role here. A
patent claim is invalid by anticipation if a prior art reference includes
every element of the claim, either expressly or inherently.396 If, for
example, a claimed invention is “the natural result” of an existing
process, the claim is anticipated.397 Recent decisions hold that an
inherent characteristic of the prior art need not have been recognized to
be anticipating.398 An inherent characteristic may be the work of nature,
like the cancer-inhibiting properties of the vegetable sprouts at issue in
In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation.399 Those properties “have existed
as long as the sprouts themselves,” so there was no patentable novelty
in a claim that referred to them.400 The same approach might be applied
in the context of patentable subject matter. If nature, without human
intervention, already supplies a benefit, then the person who discovers
that benefit cannot claim it as a patent-eligible invention. If vitamin C
naturally occurs in foods and it inherently prevents scurvy, the person

393. Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 635 (1887).
394. See supra Part IV.C.
395. Myriad, 689 F.3d at 1341–42 (Moore, J., concurring).
396. See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171, 1184
(Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated in part on reconsideration, 682 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated in
part on reh’g en banc, 476 F. App’x 747 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
397. King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
398. See, e.g., Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. VUTEk, Inc., 537 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., 471 F.3d 1363, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
399. 301 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
400. Id. at 1350.
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who discovers the connection cannot claim the ingestion of vitamin C
as a method of preventing scurvy. That much has happened already. On
the other hand, someone who turns a new understanding of nature into
a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter with utility
not found in nature has made an invention, and the invention should be
eligible for patenting. If a vitamin C concentrate is shelf-stable in a way
that no naturally-occurring vitamin C can match, then the concentrate
and methods of using it should be patentable subject matter. The
inventor has made a contribution to human welfare that nature itself did
not supply.
This is a sensible approach in general, even if in particular cases
it is difficult to apply. In Myriad, one could use the isolated genes in
ways that one cannot use the lengthy strands of DNA that occur in
nature. On the other hand, one can use apples picked from the tree in
ways that one cannot use apples that are still attached. Perhaps the
answer there is that apples fall naturally from the tree, whereas genes
may not separate themselves without human intervention. In any case,
the last thing we should do is to introduce a hypothetical obviousness
inquiry in which we pretend that every phenomenon of nature has
already been discovered. An invention may come about because the
inventor discovered a new phenomenon of nature that could be
exploited. A more potent medicine, for example, might be owed to the
discovery of a new species of plant. If the medicine derived from the
plant is new, useful, and nonobvious, it should be patentable, no matter
how the invention was made. The medicine cannot be less of a
manufacture, or more the work of nature, depending on whether or not
similar ways of processing similar plants had already been devised.
Appending an obviousness inquiry to patentable subject matter
would mean fewer restrictions on the ability of the public to use those
“basic tools” that courts have said should not be patented. But if every
obvious application of a newly-discovered “basic tool” is itself a “basic
tool,” then many valuable contributions to technology will go
unrewarded. For example, Neilson’s vessel for preheating the air in his
“hot blast” furnace must have been an obvious step, if not an inevitable
one, once it was known that heated air induced superior combustion. It
is one thing to treat the information available to the public (through
§ 102 prior art references) as a starting point for invention, and demand
that patents be reserved for nonobvious leaps. It is another thing to treat
a discovery about nature as the same sort of baseline, when such
discoveries can be the very essence of invention. Whether the discovery
involves an unknown natural law or an unknown natural phenomenon
makes little difference.
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The category of “abstract ideas” presents issues unique to itself. If
an “abstract idea” means a concept that cannot be reduced to tangible
embodiments—like certain concepts in economics, law or
mathematics—then they arguably fall outside the scope of patentable
subject matter because they do not come within the technological
“useful arts.”401 Whether a “useful arts” restriction is advisable is a
topic beyond the scope of this article. If, on the other hand, abstractness
is a matter of too much generality and breadth—a quality that can apply
to patent claims dealing with the most traditional and concrete sorts of
technology—then the answer can only be to require “meaningful
limits.” The problem is that all patent claims, by their nature, are
abstract. They describe classes of things that share common
attributes—the attributes that, in combination, constitute the invention.
An infinite variety of mousetraps may fall within a claim to a
mousetrap comprising A, B, and C. Because all patent claims
generalize, it is difficult to say when a claim leaves out so much detail,
and covers so much territory, that it should be rejected as too abstract.
As I have argued elsewhere,402 the enablement and written
description requirements are better instruments for dealing with
overbreadth than patentable subject matter. That is because they
demand a comparison between the claim and the detailed disclosures
that provides a standard of measurement. The disclosure of a
fundamental breakthrough, making possible a wide variety of
applications without further contributions to the art, justifies a broad
claim. A narrow disclosure paired with an all-embracing claim—
perhaps a claim that includes any method of achieving certain results—
demands a different outcome. In those cases, the enabling disclosure is
not commensurate in scope with the claim, and it does not demonstrate
that the applicant was, in any meaningful sense, in possession of the
claimed invention. Section 112 evaluates the claims within the context
of the specification and the state of the art when the patent application
was filed. Section 101 supplies no such context, making decisions
about abstractness more arbitrary, and less connected to the
“bargain”—an exchange of exclusive rights for disclosure—that is an
important aspect of patent law policy.403
401. See Alan L. Durham, “Useful Arts” in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419,
1520–23 (1999).
402. See Durham, The Paradox of “Abstract Ideas,” supra note 380, at 846–47.
403. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(referring to the “bargained-for exchange by which a patentee obtains the right to exclude . . . and
the public receives knowledge of the preferred embodiments for practicing the claimed
invention”).
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CONCLUSION
Subject matter eligibility—on its face the simplest of all tests of a
patentable invention—has become a difficult conundrum. Perhaps this
is because so much innovation now occurs in areas such as
biotechnology and computer programming, where invention is
increasingly difficult to distinguish from fundamental truths. The
notion of exclusive legal rights to a fundamental truth is, justifiably, a
source of concern to anyone interested in the advancement of human
welfare. Nevertheless, the ancient binary distinction between principle
and application, born in the era of telegraphs and steam engines, is still
a useful one to apply today at the threshold of patentability. When
fundamental truths, or principles or manifestations of nature, are
applied by human beings to produce new utility, we have entered the
realm of technological advancement that is properly subject to
patenting. If the inventor claims too much—perhaps framing the
invention in terms of a fundamental truth rather than a specific
application of it—tools like the enablement and written description
requirements may be used to confine the patent to the inventor’s
contribution to the art, as demonstrated in the patent application’s
detailed disclosure. Moreover, if the claimed invention is, in fact, no
more than a trivial application of a known truth, or a natural
phenomenon previously discovered, a patent may be denied on grounds
of obviousness. This step-by-step approach respects the basic structure
of the Patent Act, while ensuring that patents do not inhibit, more than
they advance, the progress of technology.
The alternative penumbral model of patentable subject matter
demands that a patent-eligible invention add to a fundamental truth
(even if it is a truth newly discovered) an “inventive concept.” This
seems to require not only an application of the fundamental truth, but
an application that is unconventional in its own right, or one that a
person of ordinary skill could not have achieved even if informed of
the discovery that made it possible. This penumbral model leads to
ambiguity and matters of degree in applying § 101 of the Patent Act—
a provision seemingly drafted with breadth and certainty in mind, and
not one that depends (like § 103) on the ever-evolving state of the art.
Most importantly, the requirement of an “inventive concept” distinct
from the discovery of an underlying truth misconceives the very
substance of invention. Invention is a matter of discovering what nature
can do, when artfully manipulated. Such discoveries should not be
treated as a starting-point for invention, but as the essence of it. If the
penumbral model of unpatentable subject matter encourages us to
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overlook that, the binary potential/application model is much in need
of revival.

